|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers|
|Peer Review Status:||Unrefereed|
|Title:||Can lobbying encourage abatement? Designing a new policy instrument|
|Citation:||Lange I & Polborn S (2012) Can lobbying encourage abatement? Designing a new policy instrument. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper 2012-03.|
|Series/Report no.:||Stirling Economics Discussion Paper 2012-03|
|Abstract:||Taking a political economy perspective this paper proposes an alternative carbon abatement policy instrument with significant cant advantages over existing policy instruments. The key feature of the proposed carbon securities is that they entitle their owners to a fi xed proportion of ex ante unknown total emis-sions. The total level of carbon emissions is set by the political process after the carbon securities have been sold. A key benefit of the proposed carbon security is that it creates a group of stakeholders, whose interest is for a smaller level of emissions and which competes with industries that consume signifi cant amounts of carbon-based energy. The advantages over existing policy tools include an equilibrium carbon price closer to the level preferred by voters and a more predictable environmental policy in the presence of either climate or political uncertainty. (JEL: D72, Q54, Q58)|
|Type:||Working or Discussion Paper|
|SEDP-2012-03-Lange-Polborn.pdf||340.24 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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