|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||The Disjunctive Conception of Perceiving|
|Citation:||Haddock A (2011) The Disjunctive Conception of Perceiving, Philosophical Explorations, 14 (1), pp. 23-42.|
|Abstract:||John McDowell's conception of perceptual knowledge commits him to the claim that if I perceive that P then I am in a position to know that I perceive that P. In the first part of this essay, I present some reasons to be suspicious of this claim - reasons which derive from a general argument against 'luminosity' - and suggest that McDowell can reject this claim, while holding on to almost all of the rest of his conception of perceptual knowledge, by supplementing his existing disjunctive conception of experience with a new disjunctive conception of perceiving. In the second part of the essay, I present some reasons for thinking that one's justification, in cases of perceptual knowledge, consists not in the fact that one perceives that P but in the fact that one perceives such-and-such. I end by suggesting that the disjunctive conception of perceiving should be understood as a disjunctive conception of perceiving such-and-such.|
|Rights:||Published in Philosophical Explorations by Taylor & Francis (Routledge).; This is an electronic version of an article published in Philosophical Explorations, Volume 14, Issue 1, March 2011, pp. 23 – 42. Philosophical Explorations is available online at: http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=1386-9795&volume=14&issue=1&spage=23|
|AH - The Disjunctive Conception of Perceiving.pdf||171.08 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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