|Appears in Collections:||Management, Work and Organisation Working Papers|
|Peer Review Status:||Unrefereed|
|Title:||New Framework for the Economic Analysis of Cooperative Firms: Self-Defined Rules, Common Resources, Motivations, and Incentives|
|Citation:||Sacchetti S & Tortia E (2010) New Framework for the Economic Analysis of Cooperative Firms: Self-Defined Rules, Common Resources, Motivations, and Incentives. EconomEtica Working Papers, No. 21. EconomEtica.|
|Series/Report no.:||EconomEtica Working Papers, No. 21|
|Abstract:||Cooperatives are characterised by mutual-benefit coordination mechanisms aimed at the fulfilment of members‟ participation rights. This paper explores the institutional elements that regulate individual behaviour and outcomes in cooperatives by bringing together new-institutionalism, behavioural and evolutionary economics. Our framework considers four main dimensions of the governance of cooperative firms: (1) the development and application of self-defined rules by the members of the cooperative; (2) the management, and appropriation of common resources and outcomes; (3) intrinsic motivations and reciprocating behaviours; (4) the implementation of suitable incentive mixes based on inclusion and reciprocity, including both pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements. An example is offered in order to highlight possible problems in the governance of cooperative firms, in particular the processes of distribution and appropriation of surplus. The example aims at introducing the discussion of the new framework of analysis.|
|Type:||Working or Discussion Paper|
|Rights:||The publisher has not responded to our queries therefore this work cannot be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author; you can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.|
University of Stirling
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