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Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: The Devils in the Details: a Response to Kiverstein's 'Minimal Sense of Self, Temporality and the Brain'
Authors: Wheeler, Michael
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Keywords: self
Issue Date: 2009
Publisher: Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness
Citation: Wheeler M (2009) The Devils in the Details: a Response to Kiverstein's 'Minimal Sense of Self, Temporality and the Brain', Psyche, 15 (1), pp. 75-81.
Abstract: While remaining in broad agreement with the overall position developed and defended by Kiverstein, I identify and discuss what I take to be a number of problems with the details of the argument. These concern (a) the claim that a certain temporal structure to conscious experience is necessary for there to be a minimal sense of self, (b) the alleged ubiquitous presence in experience of a minimal sense of self, and (c) the claim that the distinction between the constitutive background conditions and the core realiser of a given experience is ultimately unsustainable.
Type: Journal Article
Notes: Open Access journal.
Affiliation: Philosophy

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