|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Idealization, Justice, and the Form of Practical Reason (Forthcoming)|
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Citation:||Hope S Idealization, Justice, and the Form of Practical Reason (Forthcoming), Social Philosophy and Policy.|
|Abstract:||First paragraph: In this paper I argue for three claims. First, the question of which, if any, idealizations are justifiable in philosophical reflection on morality and justice cannot be separated from the question of what the appropriate form of reflection is. My second claim, invoking the ancient distinction between the forms of practical and theoretical reason, is that the appropriate form of reflection on standards of justice and morality is practical rather than theoretical. My third claim is that the form of practical reason cannot support many of the idealizations typically deployed in modern moral and political philosophy.|
|Rights:||Publisher policy allows this work to be made available in this repository. This article has been accepted for publication in Social Philosophy and Policy published by Cambridge University Press and will appear in a revised form subject to input from the Journal’s editor. The original publication will be available at: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=SOY|
This item is protected by original copyright
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.