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http://hdl.handle.net/1893/23779| Appears in Collections: | Law and Philosophy Book Chapters and Sections |
| Title: | Judgments, Facts, and Propositions: Theories of Truth in Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey |
| Author(s): | Sullivan, Peter Johnston, Colin |
| Contact Email: | colin.johnston@stir.ac.uk |
| Editor(s): | Glanzberg, M |
| Citation: | Sullivan P & Johnston C (2018) Judgments, Facts, and Propositions: Theories of Truth in Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey. In: Glanzberg M (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 150-192. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-truth-9780199557929 |
| Issue Date: | 19-Jul-2018 |
| Date Deposited: | 14-Jul-2016 |
| Series/Report no.: | Oxford Handbooks |
| Abstract: | First paragraph: Our aim in this chapter is to outline a story that ought to be familiar and unsurprising, one that traces the fate of the correspondence theory of truth from its adoption by Russell in ‘On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood’ (1910) to its repudiation by Ramsey in ‘Facts and Propositions’ (1927). Central episodes in this story are indeed very familiar. But commonly held views of them, when placed one after the other, make for a story that is more surprising and less coherent than it should be: slightly misplaced emphasis at the beginning, regarding Russell’s reasons for adopting his new theories of judgement and truth, sets things off in a direction that leads to simple error in the middle, regarding Wittgenstein’s views in the Tractatus; this error then calls for a sudden and inexplicable plot-twist in the transition to the final chapter, regarding Ramsey’s position, which in consequence is bungled. |
| Rights: | This item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. Judgments, Facts, and Propositions: Theories of Truth in Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey, The Oxford Handbook of Truth edited by Glanzberg M , 2018, reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-truth-9780199557929 |
| URL: | https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-truth-9780199557929 |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PMS-CJ paper for OUP Truth Handbook.pdf | Fulltext - Accepted Version | 503.61 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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