|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Book Chapters and Sections|
|Title:||On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology|
|Citation:||Wright C (2014) On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology. In: Dodd D, Zardini E (ed.). Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 213-247.|
|Publisher:||Oxford University Press|
|Abstract:||First paragraph: In a paper written a decade ago, I argued for the rational good-standing of a notion (perhaps realized in a number of distinct ways) of non-evidential warrant or epistemic entitlement , and for the possibility of using such a notion to fashion a unified response to two of the most traditional and disturbing forms of sceptical paradox. In this paper, I further explore the potential significance of epistemic entitlements so understood, suggest some refinements of the earlier discussion, reassess the prototype of entitlement derivable from Hans Reichenbach’s ideas about the justification of induction, and respond to a number of objections and difficulties for my proposals which have since surfaced in the literature.|
|Rights:||The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.|
|Type:||Part of book or chapter of book|
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