|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Book Chapters and Sections|
|Title:||Self-knowledge: the Reality of Privileged Access|
|Citation:||Wright C (2015) Self-knowledge: the Reality of Privileged Access. In: Goldberg S (ed.). Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Scepticism: New Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 49-74.|
first person authority
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Abstract:||Paul Snowdon's  ( “How to Think about Phenomenal Self-Knowledge” in A.Coliva, ed., The Self and Self-knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243-262) develops a range of careful and interesting criticisms of ideas about the problem of self-knowledge, and about what I interpreted as the broad contribution to it made byWittgenstein's later work, that I presented in Whitehead lectures at Harvard almost twenty years ago. Snowdon questions whether Wittgenstein's characteristic focus upon the linguistic expressions of self-knowledge holds out any real prospect of philosophical progress, and charges that my discussion is guilty in any case of distortion and over-simplification of the 'data', whether conceived as linguistic or otherwise, that set the problem of self-knowledge in the first place. In this paper, I take the opportunity to respond.|
|Rights:||This chapter has been accepted for publication and will appear in a revised form, subsequent to appropriate editorial input by Cambridge University Press, in Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays published by Cambridge University Press. 'Knowledge and reasons for belief', Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays 2015, Reprinted with permission © Cambridge University Press 2015. URL: http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-mind-and-language/externalism-self-knowledge-and-skepticism-new-essays#contentsTabAnchor|
|Type:||Part of book or chapter of book|
|Phenomenal Self-knowledge final.pdf||258.9 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
This item is protected by original copyright
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.