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Title: Self-knowledge: the Reality of Privileged Access
Authors: Wright, Crispin
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Editors: Goldberg, S
Citation: Wright C (2015) Self-knowledge: the Reality of Privileged Access. In: Goldberg S (ed.). Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Scepticism: New Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 49-74.
Keywords: Self-knowledge
privileged access
first person authority
Issue Date: Sep-2015
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Abstract: Paul Snowdon's [2012] ( “How to Think about Phenomenal Self-Knowledge” in A.Coliva, ed., The Self and Self-knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243-262)  develops a range of careful and interesting criticisms of ideas about the problem of self-knowledge, and about what I interpreted as the broad contribution to it made byWittgenstein's later work, that I presented in Whitehead lectures at Harvard almost twenty years ago. Snowdon questions whether Wittgenstein's characteristic focus upon the linguistic expressions of self-knowledge holds out any real prospect of philosophical progress, and charges that my discussion is guilty in any case of distortion and over-simplification of the 'data', whether conceived as linguistic or otherwise, that set the problem of self-knowledge in the first place. In this paper, I take the opportunity to respond.
Rights: This chapter has been accepted for publication and will appear in a revised form, subsequent to appropriate editorial input by Cambridge University Press, in Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays published by Cambridge University Press. 'Knowledge and reasons for belief', Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays 2015, Reprinted with permission © Cambridge University Press 2015. URL:
Type: Part of book or chapter of book
Affiliation: Philosophy

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