|Appears in Collections:||Accounting and Finance Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Firms, Nonprofits, and Cooperatives: A Theory of Organizational Choice|
|Keywords:||Theory of the Firm|
|Publisher:||Wiley-Blackwell for CIRIEC|
|Citation:||Herbst P & Prufer J (2016) Firms, Nonprofits, and Cooperatives: A Theory of Organizational Choice, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 87 (3), pp. 315-343.|
|Abstract:||We formalize the difference between profit-maximizing firms, nonprofits, and cooperatives and identify optimal organizational choice in a model of quality provision. Firms provide lowest and nonprofits highest levels of quality. Efficiency, however, depends on the competitive environment, the decision making process among owners and technology. Firms are optimal when decision making costs are high. Else, firms are increasingly dominated by either nonprofits or cooperatives. Increased competition improves relative efficiency of firms and decreases relative efficiency of nonprofits.|
|Rights:||This item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: HERBST, P. and PRÜFER, J. (2016), FIRMS, NONPROFITS, AND COOPERATIVES: A THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICE. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 87: 315–343. doi: 10.1111/apce.12130, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/apce.12130/full. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.|
|Affiliation:||Accounting and Finance|
|Herbst-Pruefer-FNC_151221.pdf||465.53 kB||Adobe PDF||Under Embargo until 30/11/2018 Request a copy|
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