Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/22835
Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Unrefereed
Title: Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge (Inaugural Address)
Authors: Millar, Alan
Contact Email: alan.millar@stir.ac.uk
Keywords: justified belief
perceptual knowledge
reasons for belief, normative and motivating
recognition abilities
reflective knowledge
wellfoundedness
Issue Date: Jun-2014
Publisher: The Aristotelian Society
Citation: Millar A (2014) Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge (Inaugural Address), Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 88 (1), pp. 1-19.
Abstract: A conception of the relation between reasons for belief, justified belief, and knowledge is outlined on which (1) a belief is justified, in the sense of well founded, only if there is an adequate (normative) reason to believe it, (2) (normative) reasons to believe something are constituted by truths, and (3) a reason to believe something justifies one in believing it only if it is constituted by a truth or truths that one knows. It is argued that, contrary to initial appearances, perceptual justification does not pose a problem for this view. The discussion touches upon the relation between believing for reasons and reflective knowledge.
Type: Journal Article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/22835
DOI Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2014.00230.x
Rights: The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.
Affiliation: Philosophy

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