Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/20481
Appears in Collections:Economics Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: Trust on the brink of Armageddon: The first-strike game
Authors: Abbink, Klaus
de, Haan Thomas
Contact Email: thomas.dehaan@stir.ac.uk
Keywords: Fear
Spite
Deterrence
Trust
Laboratory experiment
Issue Date: Apr-2014
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Abbink K & de Haan T (2014) Trust on the brink of Armageddon: The first-strike game, European Economic Review, 67, pp. 190-196.
Abstract: We introduce the experimental first-strike game. Two players accumulate earnings over many rounds. In any round a player can deactivate the opponent. This means that the opponent loses all earnings and faces severely reduced future payoffs. It also means that the opponent can no longer deactivate the aggressor in later rounds. Thus deactivation is a hostile act, but can serve as a self-protection device. We run four treatments to disentangle the effect of spite, fear of spite, and trust. We find the absence of pure nastiness, but nevertheless a strong fear of it. Mutual trust can considerably reduce hostility.
Type: Journal Article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/20481
DOI Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.009
Rights: The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.
Affiliation: Monash University
Economics

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