|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Essentialist Blindness would not preclude counterfactual knowledge|
|Keywords:||Epistemology of counterfactuals|
Epistemology of modality
|Citation:||Roca-Royes S (2012) Essentialist Blindness would not preclude counterfactual knowledge, Philosophia Scientiae, 16 (2), pp. 149-172.|
|Abstract:||This paper does two things. First, it defends, against a potential threat to it, the claim that a capacity for essentialist knowledge should not be placed among the core capacities for counterfactual knowledge. Second, it assesses a consequence of that claim—or better: of the discussion by means of which I defend it—in relation to Kment's and Williamson's views on the relation between modality and counterfactuals.|
|Rights:||The publisher has granted permission for use of this work in this Repository. Published in Philosophia Scientiae, 2012, Volume 16, Issue 2, pp. 149-172 by Kime Editions. The original publication can be found at: http://philosophiascientiae.revues.org/745|
|Philosophia_Scientiae_EB&CK.pdf||303.43 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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