Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status: ||Refereed|
|Title: ||Modal epistemology, modal concepts, and the Integration Challenge|
|Authors: ||Roca-Royes, Sonia|
|Contact Email: ||email@example.com|
|Issue Date: ||Sep-2010|
|Citation: ||Roca-Royes S (2010) Modal epistemology, modal concepts, and the Integration Challenge, Dialectica, 64 (3), pp. 335-361.|
|Abstract: ||The paper argues against Peacocke's moderate rationalism in modality. In the first part, I show, by identifying an argumentative gap in its epistemology, that Peacocke's account has not met the Integration Challenge. I then argue that we should modify the account's metaphysics of modal concepts in order to avoid implausible consequences with regards to their possession conditions. This modification generates no extra explanatory gap. Yet, once the minimal modification that avoids those implausible consequences is made, the resulting account cannot support Peacocke's moderate rationalism.|
|DOI Link: ||http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01236.x|
|Rights: ||Publisher policy allows this work to be made available in this repository. Published in dialectica, Volume 64, Issue 3, pages 335-361, September 2010 by Wiley-Blackwell. The original publication is available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01236.x/full|
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.