|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Why is it disrespectful to violate rights?|
|Publisher:||Wiley-Blackwell for The Aristotelian Society|
|Citation:||Cruft R (2013) Why is it disrespectful to violate rights?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113 (2, part 2), pp. 201-224.|
|Abstract:||Violating a person's rights is disrespectful to that person. This is because it is disrespectful to someone to violate duties owed to that person. I call these ‘directed duties'; they are the flipside of rights. The aim of this paper is to consider why directed duties and respect are linked, and to highlight a puzzle about this linkage, a puzzle arising from the fact that many directed duties are justified independently of whether they do anything for those to whom they are owed.|
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