Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/19295
Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Book Chapters and Sections
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: Relational Reasons and the Criminal Law
Authors: Duff, R A
Contact Email: r.a.duff@stir.ac.uk
Editors: Green, L
Leiter, B
Citation: Duff RA (2013) Relational Reasons and the Criminal Law. In: Green L, Leiter B (ed.). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law: Volume 2. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 175-208.
Issue Date: Aug-2013
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Series/Report no.: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, 2
Abstract: First paragraph: Some reasons for action are relational. I have a relational reason to Φ when I have reason to Φ in virtue of a relationship in which I stand, or a role that I fill; absent that relationship or that role I would not have that reason to Φ ; others who do not stand in that relationship or fill that role do not have that reason to Φ . I have a relational reason to feed this child -- that he is my child: absent that parental relationship, I might still have a reason to feed him, as might others who are not his parents -- for instance that he is starving; but absent that relationship, I would not have and others cannot have that specific relational reason to feed this child. I have a relational reason to respond to this person's philosophical queries -- that she is my student: absent that pedagogical relationship, I might still have reason to respond to her questions, as might others who are not her teachers -- for instance that it is good to help such seekers after philosophical insight; but absent that relationship, I would not have and others cannot have that specific relational reason to respond to her queries. I have relational reason to pay John £10 -- that I borrowed it from him and promised to repay him today: absent that promissory relationship I might still have, and others might have, reason to give him £10 -- for instance that he is impoverished and I am (or they are) rich; but absent that promissory relationship, neither I nor others could have that specific relational reason to give him £10.
Rights: The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.
Type: Part of book or chapter of book
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/19295
URL: http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/academic/series/philosophy/oxspl/9780199679829.do
Affiliation: Philosophy

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