Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/16610
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dc.contributor.authorde, Vries Frans-
dc.contributor.authorDijkstra, Bouwe R-
dc.contributor.authorMcGinty, Matthew-
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-07T23:08:17Z-
dc.date.issued2014-08-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/16610-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emissions trading. We particularly analyze the long run equilibrium in a two-sector (‘clean' and ‘dirty') model with Cournot competition among firms who face a fixed cost of production. The clean sector is defined as the sector with the highest long run cost margin on emissions. We compare the welfare implications of a cap-and-trade scheme with an emissions trading scheme based on relative intensity standards. It is shown that a firm's long run equilibrium output in the clean or dirty sector does not depend on the emissions trading format, but only depends on the fixed cost of producing in the respective sector. Intensity standards can result in clean firms selling allowances to dirty firms, or dirty firms selling to clean firms. The former outcome yields higher welfare. It is demonstrated that cap-and-trade outperforms the intensity-based trading scheme in terms of long run welfare with free entry and exit. With intensity standards the size of the clean sector is too large.en_UK
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherSpringer-
dc.relationde Vries F, Dijkstra BR & McGinty M (2014) On Emissions Trading and Market Structure: Cap-and-Trade versus Intensity Standards, Environmental and Resource Economics, 58 (4), pp. 665-682.-
dc.rightsThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.-
dc.subjectCap-and-tradeen_UK
dc.subjectEmissions tradingen_UK
dc.subjectImperfect competitionen_UK
dc.subjectIndustrial changeen_UK
dc.subjectIntensity standardsen_UK
dc.subjectPollution controlen_UK
dc.titleOn Emissions Trading and Market Structure: Cap-and-Trade versus Intensity Standardsen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargodate2999-12-31T00:00:00Z-
dc.rights.embargoreasonThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository therefore there is an embargo on the full text of the work.-
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9715-2-
dc.citation.jtitleEnvironmental and Resource Economics-
dc.citation.issn0924-6460-
dc.citation.volume58-
dc.citation.issue4-
dc.citation.spage665-
dc.citation.epage682-
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublished-
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereed-
dc.type.statusPublisher version (final published refereed version)-
dc.author.emailf.p.devries@stir.ac.uk-
dc.contributor.affiliationEconomics-
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversity of Nottingham-
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversity of Wisconsin-Madison-
dc.rights.embargoterms2999-12-31-
dc.rights.embargoliftdate2999-12-31-
Appears in Collections:Economics Journal Articles

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