|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers|
|Peer Review Status:||Unrefereed|
|Title:||Uncertainty and Climate Treaties: Does Ignorance Pay?|
|Citation:||Dellink R & Finus M (2009) Uncertainty and Climate Treaties: Does Ignorance Pay?. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2009-15.|
|Keywords:||international climate agreements|
|Series/Report no.:||Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2009-15|
|Abstract:||Uncertainty and learning play an important role in addressing the problem of climate change. In stylized game-theoretic models of international environmental treaty formation, which capture the strategic interactions between nations, it has been shown that learning usually has a negative impact on the success of cooperation. This paper asks the question whether this negative conclusion carries over to an applied multiregional climate model. This model captures the large heterogeneity between different world regions and considers not only uncertainty about the benefits but also about the costs from climate mitigation. By exploiting differences in costs and benefits between regions and allowing transfers to mitigate free-rider incentives, we derive much more positive conclusions about the role of learning.|
|Type:||Working or Discussion Paper|
University of Stirling
|SEDP-2009-15-Dellink-Finus.pdf||412.83 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
This item is protected by original copyright
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact email@example.com providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.