|Appears in Collections:||Accounting and Finance Working Papers|
|Title:||Firms, Nonprofits, and Cooperatives: A Theory of Organizational Choice|
|Citation:||Herbst P & Prufer J (2011) Firms, Nonprofits, and Cooperatives: A Theory of Organizational Choice. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network.|
|Keywords:||Theory of the Firm|
|Publisher:||Social Science Research Network|
|Series/Report no.:||SSRN Working Paper Series|
|Abstract:||We formalize the difference between firms, nonprofits, and cooperatives and identify optimal organizational choice in a model of quality provision. Firms provide lowest and nonprofits highest levels of quality. Efficiency, however, depends on the competitive environment, the decision making process among owners and technology. Firms are optimal when decision making costs are high. Else, firms are increasingly dominated by either nonprofits or cooperatives (depending on the incremental costs of quality production). Increased competition improves relative efficiency of firms and decreases relative efficiency of nonprofits.|
|Type:||Working or Discussion Paper|
|Rights:||Author retains copyright.|
|Affiliation:||Accounting and Finance|
|Herbst_2011_Firms_Nonprofits_and_Cooperatives.pdf||263.96 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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