|Appears in Collections:||Accounting and Finance Working Papers|
|Title:||The Design of Vertical R&D Collaborations|
|Citation:||Herbst P & Walz U (2011) The Design of Vertical R&D Collaborations. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network.|
|Publisher:||Social Science Research Network|
|Series/Report no.:||SSRN Working Paper Series|
|Abstract:||Suppliers play a major role in the downstream firm's innovation processes. We analyse ownership allocations and the choice of R&D technology in vertical R&D cooperations. Given incomplete contracts on the R&D outcome, there is a trade-off between R&D specifically designed towards a manufacturer (increasing investment productivity) and a general technology (hold-up reduction). We find that the market solution yields the specific technology in too few cases. More intense product market competition shifts optimal ownership towards the supplier. The use of exit clauses increases the gains from the collaboration.|
|Type:||Working or Discussion Paper|
|Rights:||Author retains copyright.|
|Affiliation:||Accounting and Finance|
Goethe University Frankfurt
|Herbst_2011_The_Design_of_Vertical_RandD_Collaborations.pdf||282.58 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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