|Appears in Collections:||Accounting and Finance Working Papers|
|Title:||IP-for-IP or Cash-for-IP? R&D Competition and the Market for Technology|
|Citation:||Herbst P & Jahn E (2011) IP-for-IP or Cash-for-IP? R&D Competition and the Market for Technology. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network.|
|Publisher:||Social Science Research Network|
|Series/Report no.:||SSRN Working Paper Series|
|Abstract:||This paper argues that firms use 'IP-for-IP' policies such as cross-licensing to strategically restrict transactions in the market for technology. The commitment to limit trade to reciprocal exchange (barter instead of cash transactions) enables firms to alter the allocation of R&D and soften R&D competition. In particular, it induces firms to focus R&D on their area of expertise. The costs of IP-for-IP are foregone gains from trade. Our analysis of the trade-offs involved shows that IP-for-IP is profitable in industries where firms differ in their capabilities to commercialize IP. Patent complementarities and firm asymmetries further strengthen the optimality of IP-for-IP.|
|Type:||Working or Discussion Paper|
|Rights:||Author retains copyright|
|Affiliation:||Accounting and Finance|
Goethe University Frankfurt
|Herbst_2011_IP-for-IP_or_Cash-for-IP.pdf||240.01 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
This item is protected by original copyright
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact email@example.com providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.