Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/10434
Appears in Collections:Accounting and Finance Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: The extent of corporate governance disclosure and its determinants in a developing market: The case of Egypt
Authors: Samaha, Khaled
Dahawy, Khaled
Hussainey, Khaled
Stapleton, Pamela
Contact Email: khaled.hussainey@stir.ac.uk
Keywords: Corporate governance disclosure
Egypt
Egyptian Stock Exchange
Developing countries
Board characteristics
Audit committee
Issue Date: Jun-2012
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Samaha K, Dahawy K, Hussainey K & Stapleton P (2012) The extent of corporate governance disclosure and its determinants in a developing market: The case of Egypt, Advances in Accounting, 28 (1), pp. 168-178.
Abstract: This paper assesses the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure and the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance (CG) attributes (board composition, board size, CEO duality, director ownership, blockholder ownership and the existence of audit committee) on the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure in Egypt. The measurement of disclosure is based on published data created from a checklist developed by the United Nations, which was gathered from a manual review of financial statements and websites of a sample of Egyptian companies listed on Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX). Although the levels of CG disclosure are found to be minimal, disclosure is high for items that are mandatory under the Egyptian Accounting Standards (EASs). The failure of companies to disclose such information clearly shows some ineffectiveness and inadequacy in the regulatory framework in Egypt. Moreover, the phenomenon of non-compliance may also be attributed to socio-economic factors in Egypt. Therefore, it is expected that Egyptian firms will take a long time to appraise the payback of increased CG disclosure. The findings indicate that that—ceteris paribus—the extent of CG disclosure is (1) lower for companies with duality in position and higher ownership concentration as measured by blockholder ownership; and (2) increases with the proportion of independent directors on the board and firm size. The results of the study support theoretical arguments that companies disclose corporate governance information in order to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs and to improve investor confidence in the reported accounting information. The empirical evidence from this study enhances the understanding of the corporate governance disclosure environment in Egypt as one of the emerging markets in the Middle East.
Type: Journal Article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/10434
DOI Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2011.12.001
Rights: Published in Advances in Accounting by Elsevier; Elsevier believes that individual authors should be able to distribute their accepted author manuscripts for their personal voluntary needs and interests, e.g. posting to their websites or their institution’s repository, e-mailing to colleagues. The Elsevier Policy is as follows: Authors retain the right to use the accepted author manuscript for personal use, internal institutional use and for permitted scholarly posting provided that these are not for purposes of commercial use or systematic distribution. An "accepted author manuscript" is the author’s version of the manuscript of an article that has been accepted for publication and which may include any author-incorporated changes suggested through the processes of submission processing, peer review, and editor-author communications.
Affiliation: The American University in Cairo
The American University in Cairo
Accounting and Finance
University of Manchester



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