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Appears in Collections:Economics Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: Insider power in wage determination
Authors: Blanchflower, David
Oswald, Andrew J
Garrett, Mario D
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Keywords: bargaining power
insider power
labour market
wage determination
Issue Date: May-1990
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell for the London School of Economics and Political Science
Citation: Blanchflower D, Oswald AJ & Garrett MD (1990) Insider power in wage determination, Economica, 57 (226), pp. 143-170.
Abstract: The paper argues that wage determination is best seen as a kind of rent-sharing in which workers' bargaining power is influenced by conditions in the external labour market. It uses British establishment data from 1984 to show that pay depends upon a blend of insider pressure (including the employer's financial performance and oligopolistic position) and outsider pressure (including external wages and unemployment). Lester's feasible "range" of wages appears typically to be between 8 and 22% of pay. Estimates of the unemployment elasticity of the wage lie in a narrow band around -0.1.
Type: Journal Article
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Rights: The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.
Affiliation: Economics
University of Warwick
London School of Economics

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