Croatia and the European Union: a long delayed journey

This article analyzes the relationship between the Croatian accession to the EU issue, especially after 2000. The author concludes that the transformation of the political scene since 2000 to 2004. had a decisive influence on the process of Croatian EU accession.


Introduction
When on 4 October 2005, the European Union's Council of Ministers agreed to begin accession talks with Croatia, the Croatian media compared this decision with international recognition of Croatia, which the European Union countries granted on 15 January 1992. Both decisions were controversial, and caused serious divisions within the European Union. In 1992, it was Germany's initiative that persuaded the then 12-member EU to recognise Croatia and Slovenia. Thirteen years later, Austria played a similar role when it conditioned its agreement to beginning of negotiations with Turkey with the same status for Croatia.
The Croatian journey to the European Union has been long delayed, due primarily to reasons that were of Croatia's own making. For the whole decade of the 1990s, This article focuses on this radical change of policy -between Tudjmanist scepticism and hostility towards the concept of Europe, and post-Tudjmanist pro-European narratives. I argue that the prospect of joining the European Union has already radically changed the character of Croatian politics in three major aspects. Firstly, it led to the defeat of isolationist nationalism, which characterised Croatian politics in the second half of the 1990s. Croatia no longer sees itself as a self-sufficient 'regional power' but as an integral part of a larger European project to which it wants to contribute. Secondly, the informal 'grand coalition for Europe' (in which now all major political parties participate) has successfully bridged the gaps between various ideological and ethnic segments of the Croatian population. For the first time since independence, Croatia is governed by a coalition which includes representatives of ethnic minorities, including the ethnic Serbs. At the same time, an unofficial 'coalition for Europe' closed the gap between former ideological adversaries -the reformed communists (SDP) and reformed nationalists (HDZ). Thirdly, the prospect of joining the European Union has fundamentally changed Croatian foreign policy orientation, which is now open to regional co-operation, including with countries such as Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. All of this was unthinkable in the 1990s, when Croatia was engaged in wars with its neighbours and even with its own Serb minority.
These changes in policy orientations were also reflected in personnel changes in the HDZ, in which the Tudjmanist forces have been successfully marginalised, while some of the most prominent politicians of the 1990s have left the party in protest.
Accession to the European Union is the main reason for these radical changes.
Isolation from Europe is no longer seen as a viable option but as a road to decay. As explained by Hidajet Biščević, Croatian Deputy Foreign Minister: 'More than ten years have passed since we successfully ended the war. We must be aware that no society can develop if it freezes itself in a certain point in time, regardless of how important this point is for the history of that society. The world around us is changing fast. If we lag behind, we will find ourselves in isolation, and we will decay'. 1 Even more explicit was Vladimir Drobnjak, the Croatian Chief Negotiator with the EU. Speaking to the Croatian business elite on 17 October 2005, Drobnjak said: 'The point of negotiating with the European Union can be described as -the complete and full transformation of Croatian society. The EU accession means an increased standard of living, a stronger economy, and more opportunities for investment and new jobs being created day by day. By becoming a member of the Union, Croatia will enter the system of collective peace and security, and will participate in the process of decision-making.' 2 These four objectives (to make society more transparent and open; to strengthen the national economy and improve the standard of living; to enhance the level of security; and to increase political influence in European and in global affairs) have specific importance within the context of the recent history of conflicts in Croatia and its immediate neighbourhood.
In the specific Croatian context, membership of the European Union is seen as the ultimate recognition that Croatia no longer represents an exception, but is a normal European state, equal in status and character to others. This is why membership of the European Union is now seen as a 'second recognition', and is compared to official recognition of independence in January 1992. 3 While the first recognition was a formal acceptance of the fact that the Croatian state exists in terms of international law and international relations, this second recognition is seen as a confirmation of its democratic credentials. The Croatian political elite now accepts that in the context of liberal democratic Europe, only states with recognised democratic credentials are to be accepted as equal and trusted.
Membership of the European Union is not only a matter of economic prospects and a guarantee of the enhanced level of security -it is the end of the transition period in which Croatia has been observed, advised and supervised -including through formal instruments and mechanisms, such as UN peace-keeping, OSCE election-observation, and the ICTY fact-discovering missions. 4 Through membership of the European Union, Croatia hopes it will finally gain trust -at least to the degree other EU states are now trusted -after a long decade and a half in which it has often been treated with some suspicion. Its membership of the European Union will thus end the initial phase of, often largely, only nominal sovereignty. Thus, through membership of the EU Croatia aims to become a 'proper' (i.e. 'sovereign') state. 5 The enthusiasm of Croatian political elites for Europe -and the transformation of former nationalists to pro-Europeanists -is based on the expectation that membership in the Union will significantly enhance the level of actual sovereignty. This article will first describe the main elements of the Tudjmanist narrative on Europe in the second half of the 1990s. It will then focus on the new, post-Tudjmanist narrative and the dynamics of political change that followed parliamentary and

Tudjman's views on Europe in the second half of the 1990s
The powerful incentive of transforming what was largely nominal sovereignty into a more substantive sovereignty remains an important reason why many former supporters of Croatian independence now support membership of the European Union. Although Tudjman secured independence in nominal terms, and achieved the territorial integrity of the new Croatian state, his nationalism in the second half of the 1990s led Croatia into isolation in which the important elements of sovereignty had been de facto lost. In domestic politics, Croatian sovereignty was challenged by the existence of the ICTY, which indicted several members of Tudjman's military elite, and even confirmed that it investigated Tudjman in the last years of his life. 6 The obligation to co-operate with the ICTY forced Croatia to make an exception with regard to the constitutional ban on the extradition of Croatian nationals to any courts outside the country. 7 This Croatian foreign policy position was weak, and in the second half of the 1990s the country was under undeclared (silent) sanctions. The EU-Croatian relationship worsened after April 1997, when the EU introduced the Regional Approach policy for countries of the Western Balkans. The very concept of the 'Western Balkans' was unacceptable to Croatia, as it linked the country with its former Yugoslav neighbours and Albania, rather than with East Central European states, which had begun accession talks with the EU. Tudjman's radical nationalism led Croatia from Yugoslavia, but it now threatened to take it back to the 'Western Balkans', and not -as initially promised -to the European Union. Tudjman angrily responded to the concept of Western Balkans, seeing it as evidence of Europe's hostility towards Croatia. Even those once close to him now began to question the future of Croatian independence if it was to remain forever linked with the politics of the Balkans. In response to what he saw as a threat to Croatian sovereignty, the Croatian President initiated an amendment to Croatian Constitution, which now According to Tudjman's interpretation, Croatia politically defeated Europe by surviving the war as an independent state. Croatia therefore represents a 'an untidy area in the European conscience', one that Europe is reluctant to face. In Tudjman's words, this was the essence of Croatia's problems with Europe, and of Europe's with Croatia. In addition, Croatia was the main reason for the failure of European policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995. It was only because of the close links and co-operation between Croatia and the United States that the American concept (as formulated by the Dayton Peace Accord) prevailed -a fact that Europeans would never forget. 9 In Tudjman's interpretation, the proposal for regional co-operation within the 'Western Balkans' (the concept which Croatian officials always used in inverted commas, or with words 'so called' in front) was Europe's angry response to this alliance between the US and Croatia. political structure) for centuries. 10 With the end of any chance for Yugoslavia to be reestablished, Croatia ended its 'Balkan episode' -but is now not allowed to join Europe. This is not only unfair -but, Tudjman argued, hypocritical. In response to European criticisms of the massive expulsion of ethnic Serbs from the region of Krajina in 1995, Tudjman became hostile to Europe and to some of its leading nations: 'Some European states dare to teach us lessons on how to treat minorities. They have forgotten that a democratic France, for example, does not even recognise the existence of minorities on its soil. Or, they urge us that we must return all Serbs who fled Croatia during the war back to Croatia, but they forget that they could not solve problems like that between Czech Republic and Germany, etc.' 11 By being unfair, acting from a position of might, not principles, the EU -Tudjman argued -often treated Croatia as a 'small nation', an unimportant factor in international politics, which could be commanded at the will of the great powers.
Tudjman's rhetoric against Europe now became increasingly similar to the one he European culture will emerge and that it will successfully replace the existing small identities. This will not happen -the historical, religious and recent ideological differences were here to stay. The bloody collapse of Yugoslavia (which was united by a much more coherent ideology and more ethno-historical similarities than the new Europe) should teach us a lesson -that these differences should not be neglected.
They will ultimately, Tudjmanists believed, make any new federal Europe as unlikely as it was the case with a federal Yugoslavia. 12 In general, such rhetoric was not unpopular in Croatia, as was evident from electoral successes of Tudjman's HDZ at all parliamentary elections in the 1990s. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, Croatia was a new state, which for the first four years of its existence suffered severe internal and inter-state military conflicts on its own territory. A belief that Europe had indeed failed to prevent or stop the conflict was widespread -not only in Croatia but elsewhere too. Europe's hesitant interventions cast a shadow of deep doubt over its ability and/or willingness to act. Secondly, the war further radicalised those who participated in it -Croats and Serbs alike.
Nationalism -being originally less than strong in the last years of Yugoslavia 13emerged quickly and grew more extreme with each day of the conflict. Tudjman's rhetoric against the 'arrogant Europe', in defence of a small, newly independent Croatian state, became rather popular with Croatian nationalists and many others. This narrative offered a new Other, when in the immediate aftermath of the 1995 victories of the Croatian Army against the breakaway Krajina region the old Other (Yugoslavia, Serbs, Belgrade) ceased to be seen as serious threat. Finally, Croatian nationalism needed constitutive myths -and the 'Homeland War' (as Tudjman called the conflicts of the first half of the 1990s) was now to be transformed into one of them. Tudjman's interpretation of Croatia fighting the mighty neighbours and defying Europe at the same time made grounds for a new myth of martyrium. 14 Croatia survived the war, despite being left 'barehanded, helpless at the mercy of the superiority of the Yugoslav Army, then considered to be one of the strongest military powers in Europe', he said on 6 November 1996 -it has survived because it has 'mustered amazing stamina and maturity with which it has alone, by virtue of its own strength and only with God's help -won its place in the international order' -it will therefore be able to survive on its own in future too. 15 This rhetoric of self-sufficiency, reminded many of Josip Broz Tito and his years of balancing 'on his own', between East and West in the Cold-War years. 16  added to his lack of understanding of cultural and political diversities in modern societies, it was not surprising that by the end of his period Tudjman presided over an increasingly isolated country, which was more often compared to Serbia than with its Central European neighbours. Paradoxically, it was in fact Tudjmanist policy that ultimately distanced Croatia from Europe and placed it firmly back in the 'Balkans', in a political sense.

Post-Tudjmanist discourses
Tudjmanist discourse dictated Croatia's domestic and foreign policy throughout the 1990s. In the second half of the decade it led to isolation from others, especially from the European Union. Even more significantly -at least for Tudjman's own supporters -this isolation led to increasing outside intrusion in the domestic affairs of the new Croatian state. For example, the Council of Europe imposed no less than 22 conditions for Croatian membership before finally admitting Croatia to its membership on 6 November 1996 (almost five years after the international recognition). From the point of view of official Croatia even more painful was the ambition of the ICTY (which was formed in 1995) to claim jurisdiction over the Croatian military -related to police actions 'Flash' and 'Storm' in Krajina. Tudjman refused to co-operate with the Tribunal over these actions, which were now becoming the core elements of the state-built myth of the 'Homeland War'. By 1999, the ICTY lost patience, and officially requested that the UN Security Council impose sanctions on Croatia for non-compliance with the Tribunal. 20 It was only when Croatia extradited the first of the accused (Mladen Naletilić Tuta) that the threat of sanctions was removed -but the anymosity between Tudjman and the ICTY was far from over.
At the same time, the discontent with Tudjman's increasingly autocratic style of governance was growing in Croatia too -especially in urban centres, including the capital Zagreb. In 1996, President Tudjman refused to recognise the results of local elections in Zagreb and imposed his own appointee as temporary mayor. When he tried to silence a popular urban Radio 101, he faced massive public protests in Zagreb -not unlike those in Belgrade against Slobodan Milošević throughout the decade.
While other East Central European countries -including the neighbouring Slovenia and Hungary -were now officially applying for membership in the European Union, Croatia looked more similar to Serbia than to the new democracies in its neighbourghood. Tudjman personally was still popular, but this was largely due to respect for his role during the first half of the 1990s, in which he led the country towards independence and stood at its helm during the war. By 1997 it was already obvious that he suffered from terminal illness -which in fact only further discouraged the opposition forces from attacking his policies. Rather than taking risks by openly challenging his policy, they decided to prepare for the post-Tudjmanist era. including the fear of being defenceless. Serbia was a great example of what was likely to happen to a state which refused to accept that there were limits to its power.
Isolation and even worse was the price that was paid for this illusion of selfsufficiency, which was based on an unrealistic perception of Serbia's greatness. This change affects not only Croatian foreign policy, but it also influences the core definition of political identity of the new Croatian state. While this identity was in the Tudjman period structured primarily in opposition to Others (Serbia, Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims, Europe, local Serbs, former Communists, et al.) it is now more than ever created around its own 'positive' definition. Looking inward, towards itself, rather than to 'hostile Others' in its neighbourhood, post-Tudjmanist Croatia discovered that it is, indeed, a small state. Subsequently, Croatia also discovered that in order to safeguard its existence, it must integrate with global and regional military and political structures. There is a new awareness that the Tudjmanist narrative of This requirement proved to be the most difficult, although public support for general Gotovina was now significantly lower than in 2001. Sanader's government faced no serious threat from possible public protests, and -as events following the arrest of the general in December 2005 confirmed -no violence was likely to be used in the case that the general was arrested and extradited. However, the government claimed that it simply had no idea of his whereabouts. In Spring 2004, the Croatian government accepted the presence of foreign intelligence services in Croatia -including the British -whose objective was to locate Ante Gotovina. A special Action Plan was co- 38 For full text of this document see http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/croatia/eu-relations.htm, accessible online on 23 October 2005. 39 It is worth noting that the Opinion stopped short of requesting that Croatia actually arrest general Gotovina. It asked only for full co-operation and for 'all necessary steps' to be taken. On these grounds, once the ICTY Prosecutor confirmed that Croatia had taken all necessary steps, it was possible for the Council of Ministers to decide in favour of accession talks starting with Croatia even in a situation in which Gotovina had not been arrested. ordinated with the ICTY and the EU, aimed at detecting and breaking a net of support for the general among the former Tudjmanists. However, several documents from these secretive operations were soon leaked to national press, in a clear manifestation that Tudjmanists were still present (if no longer influential) in the state apparatus. In However, both countries supported the beginning of negotiations with Croatia, not least because Croatia refused to participate in the 'coalition of the willing' and it was critical of the war against Iraq. Croatia was also relying on support by a group of small states in Central Europe. The new, post-Tudjmanist Croatia accepted that it was a small state, not a 'regional power'. As such, it successfully sought support from other Central European small nations -for example Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia, and even the Czech Republic (despite occasional disagreements between Prague and Zagreb), and the three Baltic States: Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. 40 43 It worked.

Conclusion
Croatian public opinion reacted with great enthusiasm to the announcement that there would finally be accession talks. Opinion polls conducted in the immediate aftermath of 4 October 2005 showed that support for Croatian membership in the European Union increased by almost 17 percent -from a very low point of 33 percent in September 44 to 49.6 per cent on 5 October 45 . This is not surprising. In the aftermath of 4 October, the EU was no longer seen as unfair towards Croatia, and no longer the supervisor, tutor and punisher. This might yet change once the talks are under way, especially if the conditions were to be seen as too restrictive. But, it is unlikely that the public would turn anti-European now when no major political party remains to organise anti-European politics. In addition, the more open the Union becomes towards Croatia, the more enthusiastic will Croats be about joining the Union.
Croatian politicians now emphasise that the good relationship they have with countries that entered the Union in 2004 would certainly help, as they were willing to help with their own experience in negotiations. The Chief negotiator, Vladimir Drobnjak, stated that the Slovakian experience would be particularly helpful, as this country went through negotiations rather quickly, having joined the accession talks at a later stage, due to political reasons. 46 Croatia will try to take advantage of its smallness in terms of territory and population and will argue that it should be easy to 'absorb' in the European Union as it has a fairly advanced economy and it is a sound and stable democracy. 47 Politicians hope that the accession talks could be completed within the next two or three years. It would be nice, they say, if Croatian citizens could participate in the elections to the European parliament in 2009. This will, however, depend not only on Croatia -which is now seen as fully cooperative with the ICTY -but also on circumstances beyond its (or perhaps anybody else's) control. In particular, two of them will be very significant. Firstly, Croatian membership in the European Union depends on general state of the Union, which has not yet found a solution for the constitutional stalemate, and which also lacks unity with regard to further enlargements. Secondly, further progress will depend on resolving certain bilateral problems that Croatia has with two of its EU neighbours -  47 Interview with Vladimir Drobnjak, ibid. This statement indicates that Croatia does not want to be treated as a part of a 'package' with Turkey, nor as a part of a 'regional approach', i.e. in the same block with other countries of the 'Western Balkans'. 48 In October 2005, Croatia proposed that the border dispute with Slovenia is dealt with via international arbitration, but Slovenia refused, and proposed that these issues should become part of the accession talks. Slovenia hopes that as a member-state of the Union it might be in an advantageous position if the talks are held within the framework of accession. In addition, the Slovenian Foreign Minister, Dimitrij Rupel, confirmed that a Slovenian referendum on Croatian membership was a possibility, if no solution for the Bay of Piran was achieved.