Neo-Ottomanism, Eurasianism or securing the region? A longer view on Turkey’s interventionism

ABSTRACT Few observers will have noticed that Turkey is second only to the USA in having large parts of its army stationed abroad. This contribution will focus on these interventions – which are diverse in nature and political origin. Featuring the second largest territorial army within NATO and only recently exploring its regional and, to some extent, global geopolitical ambitions, Turkey’s interventionism is ambiguous and remains difficult to make sense of. While Turkey’s interventions may not confront Western interests to the same extent that Russia’s do, operations, like in Cyprus, nevertheless cause a general sense of unease about this middle-ranking regional power conducting large-scale military interventions. While many are not directly sanctioned, others are outright opposed by the West. Starting from Turkey’s participation in the Korean War, there is, conversely, a longer history of Turkey playing an integral role in Western interventionism. More recently, Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East, and particularly in Syria, has given rise to claims that it continues to pursue a ‘neo-Ottoman’ foreign policy. The short history presented here reflects on the geopolitically awkward position Turkey’s interventionism takes up in between ambitions for regional hegemony, a rising global power and an integral part of the liberal Western order.

the West. Starting from Turkey's participation in the Korean War, there is, conversely, a longer history of Turkey playing an integral role in Western interventionism. More recently, Turkey's involvement in the Middle East, and particularly in Syria, has given rise to claims that it continues to pursue a 'neo-Ottoman' foreign policy. The short history presented here reflects on the politically awkward position Turkey's interventionism takes up in between ambitions for regional hegemony, a rising global power and an integral part of the liberal Western order.
Conventional approaches to intervention and liberal state building assume Western agency albeit more often than not implemented through international organisations such as the UN.
While there are exceptions, regional powers tend to conduct operations in line with Western objectives where their interests intersect with 'universal' liberal interventionist goals, frequently under the umbrella of regional organisations.
Turkey's regional military actions do not fit these conventional patterns. Neither directly supporting nor outright opposing the West as a whole, the second largest territorial army within NATO pursues regional and increasingly global geopolitical ambitions of which it is difficult to make sense. While Turkey's interventions may not confront Western interests in the same way Russia's do, some certainly clash with those of individual Western powers, notably of the United States. 1 Ever since its first minor incursions in Cyprus in 1964 to its contemporary large-scale interventions in Syria and Iraq, there is a general sense of unease about this middle-ranking regional power conducting large scale military interventions, most of which are not directly sanctioned by any international institution.
Far from these making Turkey a renegade member of the Western alliance, these regional operations in fact obscure Turkey's long-standing integral role in Western interventionism. Most notable are Turkish involvement in the Korean War, in NATO missions in Afghanistan, as well as other NATO operations, such as those in the former Yugoslavia. These are frequently forgotten as attention focuses on Turkey's independent interventions in its immediate geopolitical environment. Debates on recent regional interventions are more developed, partly because they constitute a significant departure from Turkey's traditional policy based on territorial saturation and, precisely, non-intervention.
Most accounts associate this alleged departure from established principles with Turkey's potential or actual 'neo-Ottoman' 2 , 'pan-Islamist' 3 or 'Eurasianist' 4 foreign policy 'turn'. This contrast between Turkey's 'old' Westernism and 'new' independence naturalises its NATO membership which emerged out of a particular historical conjuncture, motivated by specific geopolitical conditions. Having established a strong sense of isolationism after its This longer view on Turkey's interventionism demonstrates that despite the recent alleged 'failure' of the 'Turkish Model' for the 'New Middle East', 7 its regional activism is not a new development. It is embedded within a much larger expansion of Turkey not only as a regional, but also a global 'Emerging Power' 8  Having failed both regionally and in Syria, this vision has now turned into a liability, whereby Turkey's radicalised former clients could cause potential harm to the areas under Turkish occupation and also within Turkey. Continued Russian-supported advances by the regime beg questions about the terms and stability of the Russo-Turkish rapprochement, thus increasing the value of territories that Turkey directly and fully controls as safe havens for its client rebels.
Turkey's interventions are, in all their diversity, thus characterized by three continuities. Emirates to view Turkey increasingly as more of a threat than an ally. 14 This comes after a fall out with Egypt over President Mohamad Morsi's deposition, leaving Qatar as the only meaningful Arab ally. Establishing a presence at geopolitically-sensitive locations in the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa, far from Turkey's immediate environment and, therefore, without a direct security implication for its territorial integrity, signifies active regional geopolitical competition. Beyond the Middle East, Turkey has also started being more present and vocal in southeast Asia. Both regions are identified as having majority Muslim populations receptive for Turkish interests, economic or otherwise. Hence, the hard, regional security and ethnic Turkic dimension to Turkey's interventionism is now complemented by a naval element around the Red Sea as well as a 'soft' pan-Islamist expansion with potentially global reach.
Yet more significant are changes in Turkey's state building ambitions in the areas it controls. Though it gained some experience providing aid to Northern Cyprus, these circumstances were highly specific, not least because of ethno-linguistic commonality. While operations in Iraq remain entirely military and security oriented, Somalia and northern Syria have now become fields for experimenting with post-conflict development and state building entirely led by Turkish institutions and know-how. Both are loosely associated with the UN's state building principles and borrow plenty of practices and policies from Western humanitarianism. Turkish state building efforts are nevertheless for the most part run independently from the West. In northern Syria, Turkey is trying to build a civil administration with elements of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and a host of Turkish public and government-loyal NGOs providing essential public services including security. 15 Central to these efforts is the Turkish disaster relief agency AFAD, which also manages Syrian refugee camps in Turkey. Apart from infrastructure reconstruction, these efforts include health and education as well as the security sector. Reconstruction follows the imperative of the Turkish state being in firm control of all processes, including allocation of contracts to Turkish firms. Despite commitment to FSA control, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) retain a full occupying force. This also means, however, that Western institutions, including UN agencies, while applauding Turkey's refugee efforts at home, express concerns over the lack of access or insight into the operation. The areas remain de-facto under full Turkish control and are mainly there to contain Kurdish state building efforts. The Turkish activities borrow much from Western liberal practice; however, they are also intended as a showcase for an independent Turkish development approach and the capabilities of the Turkish state in general. Not least, the areas mitigate any new refugee pressures, provide safe havens for client fighters displaced from other areas of Syria, but also constitute Turkish bargaining chips in any future peace negotiations for Syria.
Beyond the public commitment to deal with this 'existential' or other threats to Turkey's security, the long-term intentions for Syria after any potential settlement remain obscure. They reach from a passive-defensive damage limitation to claims about an outright Much of the role of Turkey as a semi-independent intervening power reflects the politically awkward position its interventionism takes between ambitions for regional hegemony, rising global power, and integral part of the old Western order. While full of contradictions, this is not a new position for Turkey. Turkey's interventionism follows a longer tradition, transcending the perceived divide between the 'old' and 'new' or 'West' and 'East'. The semi-colonial nature of the contemporary occupations of northern Syria and Cyprus suggests that Turkey's interventionist agenda is neither outright neo-Ottoman, nor entirely anti-colonial, but is dynamic and constantly evolving under rapidly shifting geopolitical circumstances.
In sum, Turkey's interventions, both prior and during the AKP era, are motivated by four key pillars. First, the Western style securitization of its geopolitical environment, mostly motivated by the fight against the PKK, but also including the protection of minorities considered to be ethnically Turkic. Second, it is impossible to fully understand Turkey's Eurasianist repositioning without its energy-hungry growth ambitions. Lacking sizeable resources of its own, both Russia and Iran are indispensable partners, forcing some difficult 'Eurasian' compromises on Turkey, especially in Idlib. This is embedded, third, within an agenda of competitive regional power projection. This, indeed, follows historic Ottoman, but also pan-Turanic lines, reaching all the way from Sarajevo deep into the Red Sea. Attempting to gain strategic salience through partnerships with the Muslim Brotherhood or Qatar is viewed as without alternative by Ankara, but this has generated additional problems with most Arab states, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, all of which are now firmly opposed to Turkey's regional ambitions. Finally, from Bülent Ecevit giving in to popular demands for intervention in Cyprus to the contemporary widespread elite and popular support of military intervention in Syria and Iraq, military action abroad nurtures a populist militarist nationalism at home. Domestic considerations, such as the 2018 parliamentary and presidential elections, therefore, constitute a determinant of Turkish interventionism. It is this element and the resonance of anti-Western rhetoric that makes a clash of geopolitical interests between Washington and Ankara appear less of a threat and more of an opportunity to the current Turkish leadership.