After that Movie: recent work on the Scottish Wars of Independence, c.1286-c.1400

As the co-ordinator of a third-year undergraduate course on the Wars of Independence, *Scotland in the Age of Wallace and Bruce, c.1286-c.1346*, I have found the Oscar-winning film, *Braveheart* (1995) to be both a useful ice-breaker and teaching tool. Of course, Hollywood’s take on Blind Hary’s epic poem, *The Wallace*, of c.1474-8, is shot through with its own layers of historical inaccuracy and contemporary agenda (and is perhaps all the more interesting to analyse in class as a result).¹ But certain of that movie’s scenes are especially rewarding for students to consider, for example: Edward I’s juicily cynical speech to his court about ‘breeding out’ the Scots and buying off their nobles with English lands; Wallace’s patriotic call-to-arms to the ordinary footmen of the Scottish army while the nobles prevaricate before the battle of ‘Stirling’ (1297, Mel left out the bridge); and Robert Bruce’s angst-ridden rant to his leprous father about Wallace’s ability to inspire men whilst the Bruces politic and swap camps to back England at the battle of Falkirk (1298) so as to protect their kingship claim – ‘I will never be on the wrong side again!’ Above all, each of these vignettes can prompt debate about many of the key themes raised by new (post 1995-) and often revisionist research on aspects of the wars, most especially matters such as national identity, familial loyalty, propaganda and the reality of the achievements and evolving reputations of iconic figures like Longshanks, Wallace and Bruce.

Most students interested in this period continue, understandably, to prefer a military or ‘Great Man’ approach: the gory course of battles and guerilla wars, the arms
and tactics used, and the villains and heroes who drive the narrative. However, archival historians have, of late, focussed instead – and, perhaps in part, by way of a reaction to the ‘Braveheart affect’ – upon both the wider and finer detail of politics. Their work has challenged a number of accepted views, rescuing peripheral figures and probing the reality behind famous incidents, singular documents and even whole reigns. Such accessible studies are thus an undeniable boon in encouraging students to really think about this period of history. Not least, these recent publications have very often involved reassessing and building upon conclusions first presented by the seminal and still-standard work on the wars – often treated unfairly as a ‘textbook’ - G.W.S. Barrow’s *Robert the Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland*: this student’s joy has at its heart the triumph of Robert Bruce and his regime in harnessing and directing the established collective identity of significant Scots to throw off English control.

Barrow’s original reviewer, A.A.M. Duncan, has most recently provided exemplary proof that careful re-examination of the documents of the period can throw up many new and vital conclusions. *The Kingship of the Scots* traces developments in the royal succession in the Scottish realm from the ninth century and underlines the lack of certainty and established precedent in dealing with the designation of royal heirs in that kingdom as late as the passing of Alexander III (1286) and the Maid of Norway (1290), deaths which precipitated, as most scholars now call them, the wars of Scottish Succession. The various legal paths of succession to Scotland’s throne possible after 1290 prompted a crisis which Edward I was well able to exploit (and later rewrite through the manipulation of the documentary record). This period was also surely marked by far stronger tensions within Scotland between rival claimants and their supporters than
acknowledged by, say, Barrow or Alan Young. The latter’s study of the Comyn family c.1212-1314 underlines the stability brought to the Guardianships of 1286-90 by that experienced governmental dynasty but perhaps underplays their exclusive, essentially factional dominance of power.\(^5\) Duncan’s study also reveals the pragmatic manoeuvering and complex documentary appeals of the Bruce family before and during the so-called ‘Great Cause’ of 1291-2: the elder Bruce was among the first to submit to Edward I as Scotland’s overlord (John Balliol submitted last), a reflection of his weaker claim in law.\(^6\)

Current work is very keen to debunk the sorry reputation of Balliol – really John I of Scotland (1292-6) – known for evermore as ‘Toom Tabard’ as a result of his seemingly spineless capitulation to Edward I’s invasion in 1296. For some historians, Balliol is still an uninspiring character who – if not a complete puppet of the English king – was controlled by the Comyn party. But Fiona Watson, and now others, has speculated that John may have been more involved in matters than previously acknowledged. Most open to question is the accepted fact of John’s removal from power in Scotland in 1295 by a council of Scottish magnates who then forged the first of many alliances with France. But Balliol’s deposition could in truth be later propaganda circulated by the English – this revolution is, after all, only reported in two contemporary English chronicles – or by rival claimant Bruce when king. The treaty with France certainly played upon the Picardy lands and connections of the Balliol family – with John’s heir, Edward, promised a French royal marriage (a match he may later have traded in favour of an Italian noblewoman). The Balliol family still await the full published study of their lordship in England, Scotland and France which they deserve.\(^7\)
Balliol’s removal from the kingdom together with the realm’s records, the inaugural stone of Scone and other relics, left many of his subjects with a difficult choice – to submit or to fight, and, if the latter, what to fight for? Again, Fiona Watson has emphasised the fledgling nature of national identity at this time. Most medieval Scots, if they fought the English forces c.1296-1304, did so for the return and restoration of their rightful king rather than the preservation of their own independent kingdom and its institutions: without the possibility of the king’s return the collective resolve of the community of the realm crumbled quickly in 1303-4.

Scholarly studies of individual magnate kindreds or localities have also revealed the complex interaction of factors which determined just who fought for whom or sat on the fence, and when. Geography, past familial and marital associations, land-holding patterns, historic or opportunistic local rivalries and – above all – pragmatism, ambition, luck and fate determined the loyalties and actions of laymen of rank, not simply any growing or predominant sense of Scottishness or Englishness. Thus for some it was easy: the earls of March or Dunbar sided with England from the first because of their proximity to the border and their ancient English heritage and lands – only Edward II’s failure in the north would see them rejoin the Scottish camp of Bruce and then switch back briefly to Edward III and Edward Balliol c.1332-5 (although the tenth earl’s wife always fought for the Scots); in contrast, the unfortunate earls of Strathearn in central Perthshire struggled to play all sides and would be alive but politically bankrupt by 1340; the Comyns and their close associates fought for Balliol because that way lay their continued dominance of the Scottish political scene (as did their submission to Edward I in 1304); the Comyns’ great neighbours in the north-east, the Strathbogies of Atholl, at first fought for Balliol
but became his sworn enemy in exile thereafter when no rewards came their way.\textsuperscript{10}

Robert Bruce’s own vacillations and several attempts to hijack the Scottish cause have long been well known.

But if things were murkier and less certain for the elite of Scotland it was also much harder for lesser Scots and apparently black-and-white figures like Wallace to operate in this context. Colm McNamee’s earlier study of Wallace’s invasion of northern England in late 1297 has revealed a fairly conventional military mind sometimes struggling to control his troops and their violent anti-Englishness or to make a significant impact as a lone general and Guardian without committed support from Scotland’s nobility in the wings.\textsuperscript{11} In more recent work, Wallace has also emerged even more so as a lesser noble capable of independent action but clearly given a strong lead by the key churchmen of the realm. As such, the crucial guidance of the bishops of St Andrews and Glasgow may have seen Wallace contemplate switching allegiances from Balliol to Bruce c.1299 as the only man capable of reviving the kingship: the handful of extant contemporary documents concerning Wallace’s actions thus warrant close review.\textsuperscript{12}

Above all, though, since \textit{Braveheart}, there has been renewed historical consensus and reflection upon Wallace’s true achievement and legacy, that achieved \textit{after} his death through a cult of martyrdom and patriotism forged and repeatedly recast to suit the political and spiritual needs of later generations of Scots right up to the present post-devolution age. Graeme Morton’s study, indeed, presents a vital analysis of the creation of a myth beginning with the late fourteenth-century chroniclers and Blind Hary through to the world-wide web.\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Braveheart}’s key source itself can now be read in a republished
edition of Sir William Hamilton of Gilbertfield’s popular anglicized version of 1722 with appropriate post-movie preface examining the Wallace cult since c.1474-8.¹⁴

However, if students now find that Scotland’s resistance of England was due much less to the role of individual Scots than they might have expected, recent scholarship also provides them with a wider range of explanations for Edwardian failure both in the short and long term. The importance of Scottish diplomatic efforts – especially c.1298-1302 – has long been recognised by documentary scholars. But now Scottish embassies and key diplomatic texts, as well as the military efforts of men like Wallace, Andrew Murray and the Comyns and their party, can be placed alongside English practical difficulties in conquering and re-conquering Scotland. Fiona Watson’s study of Edward I’s occupation regimes and invasions has underlined the harsh realities of life for small, underpaid, hungry and ill-motivated English garrisons (1,000 to 1,500 men at most), and their reluctant captains. These forces were little helped by a hard-headed king who struggled both to pay for their upkeep (at £10,000 to £20,000 a year) and to find time free from truces with France (which also embraced the Scots) so as to launch a decisive campaign. Despite these complex problems, Edward I came close in 1305 to learning his lesson from 1296 by settling re-conquered Scotland in a fashion more sympathetic to Scottish governmental sensibilities.¹⁵ But the same logistical and fiscal problems can be mapped onto the subsequent military efforts of Edward II and Edward III in addition to their own political distractions. More generally, a number of studies of wider European relations c.1250-1400 serve to underline the degree to which relatively small, poor and peripheral Scotland was able only to react to events dictated by the greater powers – England, France and the Papacy – rather than to determine her own
fate: most obviously, Scotland often faced English domination in the wake of French military and diplomatic defeat (1302, 1346, 1356-7).  

This picture of heightened uncertainty and of unpredictable and competing forces at work in Scotland c.1286-1305, sharpened by this recent scholarship, arguably makes it all the more understandable that Robert Bruce’s final decisive bid for the throne in 1306 should have begun so messily and nearly foundered within a matter of weeks. Barrow’s King Robert is certainly a convincing figure who must use all his resolve, guile, military genius, patronage and lay and clerical allies to recover his cause from near destruction and exile and to seize the national platform from his Scottish and English enemies: this was a long, bloody civil war as well as a patriotic conflict given God’s blessing at Bannockburn (23-4 June 1314) and underlined by Bruce’s ostensible forfeiture of his Scottish opponents a few months later (although, key Scottish nobles and prelates would be permitted to enter his peace at a price for years to come). However, Barrow – like the author of *The Bruce*, John Barbour, archdeacon of Aberdeen, writing c.1371-5 – gives only condensed coverage and neat closure to the fifteen years of Robert I’s reign which followed Bannockburn: this is the model structure followed too by most popular biographies of Bruce. More recently, though, scholars have focussed on the problems Bruce’s regime faced in this period.

Most obviously, scrutiny has been given – as first urged by A.A.M. Duncan – to the levels of support which Bruce commanded at various dramatic stages of his reign. Rather than being feudally ‘conservative’ and mostly pardoning and patronising key regional families throughout Scotland after c.1308-9, several studies now argue that Bruce’s resettlement of lands and offices moved gradually towards the creation of a very
different Scottish political community than that which would surely have emerged under a Balliol/Comyn or English regime. New men were elevated over other nobles and Bruce encouraged local rivalries as a method of divide and rule. However, Bruce’s lordship in doing so requires close examination, beyond merely the rewards to his big three or four ‘lieutenants’ (Edward Bruce, Thomas Randolph, James Douglas, Walter Steward). In many localities of Scotland Bruce’s patronage did not begin in earnest until the 1320s and even then required time for the recipients to enforce their presence on the ground. The Bruce resettlement, indeed, is a topic which still awaits a full study. But it is clear that in some regions Bruce’s necessary patronage had a destabilising effect. Bruce’s favour to some of his key supporters in south-west Scotland after the death in late 1318 of Edward Bruce, created earl of Carrick and lord of Galloway before Bannockburn, provoked an angry reaction from former Comyn and Balliol supporters in that region, several of whom conspired to assassinate Robert: this ‘Soules conspiracy’ was smashed ruthlessly by Bruce in 1320. Yet just before his death Bruce betrayed his awareness of the vulnerability of his settlement, making a pilgrimage through the south-west in 1329 and taking the opportunity to grant out further lands there in return for military and naval services.

Although crushed, the ‘Soules conspiracy’ also exposes, in part, another crack in the veneer of the unanimity behind ‘Good King Robert’. As Roland Tanner in particular has shown, at moments of internal and external crisis Bruce’s regime very often sought to exploit the apparent consensus of the ‘community of the realm’ in parliament so as to inflate the level of support Bruce actually commanded and to test the loyalty of key subjects to the usurper monarch and his dynasty. The need to engineer such public affirmations of legitimacy and popular authority was prompted both by English and Papal
diplomatic overtures and grave doubts about the Bruce succession. Thus when Bruce’s full title was ignored by foreign powers and he was threatened with excommunication for his murder of John Comyn in 1306, or when his subjects feared the consequences of Bruce’s daughter, Marjorie, succeeding before his adult brother, Edward, then public documents were drawn up and nobles and prelates required to attach their seals to such statements of the party line thus enshrined in law. However, the cold reality was that in stage-managing parliaments for the purposes of manufacturing such declarations of the nobility (1309, 1320) and clergy (1309-10) or acts of succession (1315, 1318, 1326), the Bruce regime made free use of the seals of important individuals who were often not present or had been forfeited or coerced, or were un-rewarded by, or at odds with, the new king. Most graphically, the death of Robert’s designated heir, Edward Bruce, in Ireland in October 1318, prompted an emergency parliament at which another act of succession recognising the king’s infant grandson, Robert Stewart, as royal heir presumptive was passed together with injunctions against sedition. But this did not stop the so-called Soules conspirators from concocting their plan in concert with England and Edward Balliol: the latter, indeed, is now known to have arrived in the southern kingdom within weeks of Edward Bruce’s demise. Robert I’s attempts in early 1320 to ward off excommunication by dispatching the celebrated letter of the nobility – the Declaration of Arbroath – to the papacy, must also have involved a round of seal abuse provoking further unrest which the royal government did its best to destroy and conceal at a time of extreme vulnerability for the sonless king.²¹

Like the reputation of Wallace, the Declaration of Arbroath itself is perhaps more appreciated by recent studies – such as Edward Cowan’s excellent new work - for its
legacy and deep meaning to early-modern and modern Scots rather than any such mass sentiment felt in its own time of production. As a manifesto of patriotic principle and popular sovereignty, embodying the subjects’ right to police the behaviour of a king, the Declaration would have been appreciated by Scottish churchmen as a genuine statement of an ideal constitutional relationship designed to protect their institution within the kingdom. But, above all, it was recognised by Bruce as an invaluable political tool. It is uncertain, though, if the Declaration would have spoken, as yet, to the majority of Scottish nobles, or even to townsmen and farmers plagued since 1296 by English armies, as a statement of patriotic identity. It is, then, the propaganda value of such political behaviour that recent studies have debated. Bruce attempts to win and shape his subjects’ (and enemies’) hearts and minds can also be read in his personal devotions before 1329; in his funerary request for a pilgrimage to the Holy Land for his heart and interment for his body at Melrose Abbey on the border; in chronicle write-ups of his reign in late fourteenth-century Scottish works (and contemporary French chronicles); and, of course, in Barbour’s The Bruce. As well as trumpeting the triumph of Bruce and his great knight, Douglas, and others, over the auld enemy this epic poem is also very much a product of its times (c.1371-5) and a riposte to the pro-English sentiments of Bruce’s son, David II (born 1324, ruled 1329-71): it was a work commissioned by Robert Stewart (who became Robert II, 1371-90) and the later Douglas earls.

These latter lords were the true heirs to Bruce’s other great legacy - inherent Scottish military aggression against England. Robert I’s ongoing domestic difficulties with former Balliol-Comyn supporters and his succession unfolded against a background of relative Scottish military success against a distracted Edward II. Colm McNamee’s
groundbreaking study of the nature and impact of the Bruce regime’s incursions into northern England and Ireland has argued convincingly that, at times, these campaigns threatened to amount to Scottish military ‘hegemony’ over the British Isles as a whole, endangering the security of England, Ireland and Wales. Yet at the same time the long-term effectiveness of the Bruce Scots’ invasions of English territory were limited. A remote English crown could ignore border breaches and no matter how violent and destructive the Scottish raids, northern English communities recovered relatively quickly, suffering more (as did Ireland) from a Europe-wide famine c.1315. The Scots’ campaign in Ireland – a front Bruce had to open to satisfy his brother’s ambitions and because his English raids had not forced a peace after Bannockburn – produced similarly frustrating results. It has fallen mostly to Irish historians to illuminate the great scale of both the Scottish presence and failure in that occupied province. The English were worried and resources redirected but the Scots paid a high price for imposing Edward Bruce as high king of Ireland, ultimately the destabilisation of the Bruce succession c.1318-20. Between 1320 and 1323 the sonless Robert Bruce was obliged to seek longer truces and peace with England to allow him breathing space to put his own house in order. In the end, Bruce’s two-front tactic was only justified in 1327-8 when simultaneous and unexpected incursions into northern England and Ulster forced the English government which had just deposed and murdered Edward II to sue for peace.

However, recent studies have also emphasised how the peace talks, largely dictated by Bruce at that time, exposed the potential tensions within the new Scottish kingdom and identity borne and nurtured by his seizure of power. The Bruce regime’s leading noble supporters – those lords and their kindreds best rewarded since 1314 – were
dominated by houses which had built their new fame and fortune upon a ‘patriotic’ war against England and at the expense of their Scottish enemies. This generation of war could thus not tolerate any peace treaty which might involve the return to their aristocratic community of nobles forfeited c.1314 also in possession of land in England (as was common before 1296) even if they in turn might be compensated with land in the southern kingdom. Indeed, work by Sonja Cameron and Alasdair Ross in reviewing the paucity of documents from c.1327-32 suggests that Robert I, far from sticking to the principle that no-one should ever again hold lands of both the crowns of England and Scotland and thus dilute their loyalties (as Barrow suggests), may in fact have at first agreed to a partial restoration to Scottish lands of the ‘Disinherited’ in exile in England but later fudged the issue. Aware that any restoration of forfeited lords would upset his settlement Bruce broke promises given ‘in accordance with the treaty’ of Edinburgh-Northampton (1328) after it was sealed and solemnized by the Pope, so anxious was he to secure some measure of firm closure before his own death and the accession of his minor son, David.29

Pressure to finally alienate the ‘Disinherited’ must have come from the new great men of the realm and in this there is arguably a hint of a level of expectancy amongst Robert’s nobility which he would have been hard pressed to contain had he lived longer than his fifty-five years. Work by Michael Brown has revealed Sir James Douglas’s willingness to defy the crown over matters of jurisdiction affecting his massive regality of power south of the Forth in the 1320s.30 Former opponents and allies like the earl of Ross and Macdonald of Islay respectively would also soon display their ability for independent empire-building outwith the royal heartlands.31 And close kin like the
Stewarts would hanker for greater lands and influence – perhaps as earls (of Fife?) – on a par with the Randolph earls of Moray. Moreover, the next generation of ambitious heirs of these lieutenants of Robert Bruce would be reared on war against England.\textsuperscript{32}

It followed that on the one hand these aforementioned families would be the bulwark of Scottish resistance in David Bruce’s name against renewed invasion by Edward III and Edward Balliol after 1332. But on the other hand, the demand of these houses to dominate the Scottish community had caused Robert I to compromise the peace treaty and to leave the unfinished business of the ‘Disinherited’ in the laps of the illegal English regime of Isabella and Mortimer and the humiliated Edward III. The Stewarts, Rosses, Douglases, MacDonalds and others would, moreover, regularly challenge the authority of David II, a child king unable to rule in his own name until 1341. When David resorted to political pragmatism and sought peace with England after his capture in battle in 1346 – a peace not too different from that sought by his father in 1328 – his plans would break hard against the will of these leading Scottish nobles who were committed with all their being to alliance with France against the auld enemy. These lords were well able to exploit the consultative powers of the community in parliament – which Robert I’s regime had controlled rigorously c.1309-29 – to redirect David’s policy. Thus just as in Robert I’s legacy lay the seeds of further war c.1332-57, so the necessary cost of bought support for the father’s reign was a cold struggle for power and royal succession between the son and subjects.\textsuperscript{33}

In sum, historical work published since \textit{that} film has already challenged many of the accepted truths of the Wars of Independence and placed these events in a wider Scottish, British and European context, both in the fourteenth century and eras since. It is
to be hoped that students will respond to these valuable studies, that such work will continue and that the spirit of reassessment will be further directed to the thirteenth-century in which time the backgrounds and mind-sets of the key players of the Wars were forged.\textsuperscript{34}

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\begin{itemize}
\item[12] M. Penman, \textit{The Scottish Civil War: the Bruces, the Balliols and the War for Control of Scotland, c.1286-c.1356} (Stroud 2002), which provides a synthesis of recent work on the Wars [see pp. 11-14 and 52-4 for 1299]. See also E. King, \textit{Introducing William Wallace: The Life and Legacy of Scotland’s Liberator} (Stirling 1997).
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17 See for example the structure of C. Bingham, *Robert the Bruce* (London 1998). 1,000 of Barbour’s 13,000 lines of poetry cover events up to and including Bannockburn; Barrow covers 1314-29 in two thematic chapters in a fifteen chapter book.


21 Penman, ‘Soules conspiracy’ (op. cit.). Most of these documents are reproduced in the excellent E. Carmichael, E. Hamilton and N. Shead eds., *Sources for the Study of the Scottish Wars of Independence, 1249-1329* (Scottish CCC Highers, 1998).


28 See now the collection of papers in S. Duffy ed., *Robert the Bruce’s Irish Wars: the Invasions of Ireland, 1306-29* (Stroud 2002). Barrow gives only brief attention to Ireland in his 3rd edition.
34 See for example the forthcoming papers in R. Oram ed., The Reign of Alexander II (Edinburgh).