What is 'Complex Government' and what can we do about it?

'Complex government' relates to many factors: the size and multi-level nature of government; the proliferation of rules, regulations and public bodies; a crowded arena with blurry boundaries between policymakers and the actors who influence them; and, general uncertainty when people interact in unpredictable ways within a changeable policy environment. Complex government is difficult to understand, control, influence and hold to account. This article considers it from various perspectives: scholars trying to conceptualise it; policymakers trying to control or adapt to it; and, scientists, interest groups and individuals trying to influence it.

Complex Government as a concept

For scholars, a key aim is to distinguish between the intuitive meaning of complex government, as big, complicated and difficult to understand, and the specific meaning of complex system. Policy theory breaks down the intuitive idea into five key elements: actors, institutions, networks, ideas, and context. The task is to make a complex process simple enough to understand, by focusing on or more elements.

When we focus on actors, we examine who they are and how they act. Actors can be individuals or collectives, including private companies, interest groups and governments bodies (Weible, 2014). The literature explores a shift from an early post-war period characterised by centralized and exclusive policymaking towards a fragmented multi-level system with a much larger number of actors. This development could change the meaning of ‘policymaking’, from an association with central government action towards a wider policymaking system containing more key players.

Things get complicated further when we compare ‘rational’ action with other explanations for behaviour. Most theories identify ‘bounded rationality’: people do not have the time, resources and cognitive ability to consider all information, possibilities, solutions, or consequences of their actions. They use informational shortcuts or heuristics to produce good-enough decisions (Simon, 1976: xxviii). Actors may be ‘goal-oriented’, but also use emotional, intuitive and often unreliable heuristics associated with ‘fast’ thinking (Kahneman, 2012). For example, policymaker attention may lurch dramatically from one issue to another, ‘advocacy coalitions’ may ‘demonize’ their opponents, and policymakers may draw on quick, emotional judgements to treat different social groups as deserving of government benefits or sanctions (Kingdon, 1995; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Jenkins-Smith et al, 2014; Schneider et al, 2014).

When we examine ‘institutions’, we want to know the rules, norms, and practices that influence behaviour. Some are visible and widely understood – such as constitutions which shape other institutional activity, by establishing the venues where decisions are made, and the rules that allow actors to enter the policy process (Ostrom et al 2014). Or, institutions are informal rules, often only understood in particular organisations. This wide definition allows
us to compare formal understandings of how people should act, with informal ‘rules of the game’. Crucially, different rules develop in many parts of government, often with little reference to each other. This can produce: unpredictable outcomes when people follow different (often contradictory) rules when they interact; a multiplicity of accountability and performance management processes which do not join up; ‘international regime complexity’ when agreements, obligations and bilateral deals overlap (Alter and Meunier, 2009); or, a convoluted statute book, made more complex by the interaction between laws and regulations designed for devolved, UK and EU matters (Cabinet Office and Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, 2013).

When we identify policy networks (‘subsystems’), we begin with the huge reach and responsibilities of governments, producing the potential for ministerial ‘overload’. Governments divide responsibilities into broad sectors and specialist subsectors, and senior policymakers delegate responsibility to civil servants. ‘Policy community’ describes the relationships that develop between the actors responsible for policy decisions and the ‘pressure participants’, such as interest groups, with which they engage (Jordan and Cairney, 2013). For example, civil servants seek information from groups. Or, they seek legitimacy for their policies through group ‘ownership’. Groups use their resources - based on what they provide (expertise, advice, research) and/or who they represent (a large membership; an important profession; a high status donor or corporation) – to secure regular access to government.

In some cases, the relationships between policymakers and pressure participants endure, and policy becomes the ‘joint product of their interaction’ (Rose, 1987: 267-8). Consequently, we use the term ‘governance’ to describe a messy world in which it is difficult to attribute outcomes simply to the decisions of governments (Rhodes, 1997). Jordan et al (2004) also use the term ‘pressure participant’ to remind us that ‘lobbying’ to government is not done simply by interest groups; the most frequent lobbyists are businesses, public sector organisations, and other types of government body at various levels of government. ‘Multi-level governance’ captures this messy process involving the blurry boundaries between policy produced by elected policymakers and civil servants, and the influence of a wide range of governmental, non-governmental and quasi-non-governmental bodies (Bache and Flinders, 2004).

When we focus on ideas - a broad term to describe ways of thinking, and the extent to which they are shared within groups, organisations, and networks – we identify two main types. The first describes the ways of thinking that people accept to such an extent that they are taken for granted or rarely challenged (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014). The second is the more intuitive, ‘I have an idea’, meaning, which refers to the production of new ways of thinking, combined with the persuasion necessary to prompt other actors to rethink their beliefs. The policy process involves actors competing to raise attention to problems and propose their favoured solutions. Not everyone has the same opportunity. Some can exploit a dominant understanding of the policy problem, while others have to work harder to challenge existing beliefs. A focus on ideas is a focus on power: to persuade the public, media and/or
government that there is a reason to make policy; and, to keep some issues on the agenda at
the expense of others (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Cairney, 2012a: 62).

‘Context’ describes a policymaker’s environment. It includes the policy conditions that
policymakers take into account when identifying problems, such as a political system’s
geography, demographic profile, economy, and mass behaviour (Cairney and Heikkila,
2014). It can refer to a sense of policymaker ‘inheritance’ - of laws, rules, and programs –
when they enter office (Rose, 1990). Or, we may identify events, either routine, such as
elections, or unanticipated, including social or natural crises or major scientific breakthroughs
and technological change (Weible 2014). In each case, we consider if a policymaker’s
environment is in her control and how it influences her decisions. In some cases, the role of
context seems irresistible – examples include major demographic change, the role of
technology in driving healthcare demand, climate change, extreme events, and ‘globalisation’
(Cairney, 2012a: 113-4). Yet, governments have shown that they can ignore such issues for
long periods of time.

Complex policymaking systems

Each of these five elements could contribute to a sense of complexity. When combined, they
suggest that the world of policymaking is too complex to predict or fully understand. They
expose slogans such as ‘joined up’ or ‘holistic’ government as attempts to give a sense of
order to policymaking, in the face of cross-cutting or ‘wicked’ issues, when we know that
policymakers can only pay attention to a small portion of the issues for which they are
responsible.

We can go one step further to describe government as a complex system. Complexity theory
explains outcomes in terms of the ‘whole’ policymaking system, ‘greater than the sum of its
parts’. It identifies, in policymaking systems, the same properties found in complex systems
in the natural and social world, including: ‘non-linear dynamics’ when some forms of action
are amplified and others dampened, by positive and negative feedback; ‘sensitivity to initial
conditions’, or the cumulative effect of early decisions and events; ‘strange attractors’ or
regularities of behaviour despite the unpredictability of complex systems; and, ‘emergence’
(Cairney 2012b: 124-5; Geyer and Rihani, 2010).

Many of these concepts can be linked to established policy concepts. For example, non-linear
dynamics are caused partly by bounded rationality and the tendency of policymakers to
ignore most issues and promote a few to the top of their agenda (Baumgartner and Jones,
2009). Sensitivity to initial conditions is the focus of historical institutionalism, which traces
current institutions to the cumulative effects of decisions made in the past (Pierson 2000).
‘Emergence’ refers to the systemic outcomes of interactions between people based on local
rules, in the absence of central control (Cairney and Geyer, 2015). This may require some
translation when we consider political systems. Although there is a well-established literature
on ‘bottom up’ implementation (from Lipsky, 1980, Barrett and Fudge, 1981, and Hjern,
1982; see also Hill and Hupe, 2008; Nilsen et al, 2013), and central government does not
control local policy delivery in an absolute sense, few of us would reject its role and influence on local outcomes entirely.

**Complex government as a challenge for policymakers**

‘Complex government’ can be used to reject the ‘Westminster model’ - which describes the concentration of power in the hands of a small number of people in central government - or a ‘British political tradition’ based on a top-down, ‘government knows best’ approach (Blunkett and Richards, 2011). Complexity theory invites us to consider a more realistic policymaking philosophy, and strategies including: relying less on centrally driven targets, and punitive performance management, in favour of giving local bodies more freedom to adapt to their environment; trial-and-error projects, that can provide lessons and be adopted or rejected quickly; and, to teach policymakers about complexity so that they are less surprised when things go wrong (Geyer, 2012; Cairney, 2012b; Room, 2011; Hallsworth and Rutter 2011).

Yet, there is a profoundly important tension between the reality of complex government and the assertion of government control and accountability. For example, UK policymakers have to justify their activities with regard to the Westminster model’s narrative of accountability to the public via ministers and Parliament (Rhodes, 2013: 486). We expect ministers to deliver on their promises, and few are brave enough to admit their limitations (until they leave government). Civil servants also receive training to encourage them to use management techniques to exert control over their policymaking tasks (Cairney, 2014a). Squaring this circle is not easy.

Sanderson (2009) suggests that important strides have been made by the Scottish Government, which sets a broad national strategy, invites local bodies to produce policies consistent with it, and measures performance using broad, long term outcomes. This is consistent with a Scottish system designed to contrast with Westminster culture, but important tensions still remain about the government’s dual aim to encourage discretion and produce nationwide aims (Cairney and St Denny, 2014). We can also identify tensions (in case studies) in countries such as the US, where policymakers present an image of strong performance management, partly to mask their frustrations with key organisations and a lack of implementation success (Radin, 2006; Honig, 2006).

**Complex government as a challenge for participants and reformers**

Most pressure participants have the same choice when seeking to engage with complex government: to bemoan and seek to reform, or to be pragmatic and adapt. This is a feature of the interest group world, in which we identify a tendency for groups to follow the action (Mazey and Richardson, 2006), often maintaining multi-level lobbying strategies, either directly or as part of networks (although the willingness and ability of groups to do so varies markedly - Keating et al, 2009; Keating and Wilson, 2014; Cairney, 2009).

In contrast, we can identify in some scientific circles a naïve attachment to the ideal of ‘evidence based policymaking’ in which we should seek to minimise the gap between the
evidence-based identification of a problem and a proportionate government response (Cairney and Studlar, 2014). This idea relies on a concentration of power at the centre, and a direct link between scientists and elected policymakers. ‘Complex government’ prompts scientists to be pragmatic. First, they might adapt their strategy to help produce the dissemination of evidence throughout a messy policy process (such as by working with local governments, public bodies and stakeholders to ‘co-produce’ meaningful measures of effective interventions in particular areas). Second, they may recognise that policy-relevant knowledge is not just about the evidence of a problem; it also requires knowledge of how the policy process works and how any solution will fare (Cairney, 2014b).

Complex government also prompts us to consider how we can hold policymakers to account if the vast majority of the population does not understand how the policy process works; if policy outcomes seem to emerge in unpredictable or uncontrollable ways, or the allegation of complexity is used to undermine popular participation or obscure accountability (Bartley and Davies, in correspondence, 2014). The aim of political reformers, to go beyond representative government and produce more participatory forms of democracy, may solve a general sense of detachment by the political class, but it will not necessarily increase the transparency, and a popular understanding, of government.

References
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