Regeneration and poverty in Scotland: Evidence and policy review

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Introduction

This report reviews the evidence on the impact of regeneration on poverty in Scotland. It is part of a wider research project for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation that looks at the impact of regeneration on poverty across the UK. A main report - Regeneration and poverty: evidence and policy review (Crisp et al., 2014) - comprehensively summarises all the evidence across the UK. This report on Northern Ireland is one of three smaller reviews produced, respectively, for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland to ensure full discussion of the distinct approaches taken across the UK with regard to regeneration as a devolved policy area1. Details of the methods used to review the available evidence are provided in the main report.

There is a tendency when undertaking policy reviews to package up policy into distinct, almost hermetically sealed, temporal periods, split by different political administrations: in this case pre-Thatcher / Thatcher-Major / New Labour. However there are drawbacks to adopting such an approach. Policy rarely aligns neatly with administration dates. While some contentious policies may get reformed almost immediately with the advent of the new political regime, most typically flow over and continue to be pursued for some time before becoming subject to reform. Within Scotland this delay is further exaggerated given the fact that there has long been a different policy-making and legislative structure, to accommodate both the country's distinct territorial politics and the specific legal requirements of Scots Law, thus resulting in distinct, and on occasions differing policies. That said, given for the most part Britain is a unified state, Scottish policy tended to mirror UK policy objectives, if not in the exact detail, then at least in broad conception. Scottish devolution, enacted in 1999, further acknowledges and reinforces such policy difference or divergence, now more so with a Scottish Nationalist government in Scotland and the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition in the UK, than when New Labour controlled both administrations. So currently, the health service, higher education, schools, housing and regeneration policy now appear markedly different when compared to England. To a degree Scotland holds onto social democratic policy objectives that have been progressively abandoned within England, rather than the rolling out of a distinctive and new agenda. Refining the operational nuances of that pre-existing policy agenda tends to characterise the current situation in Scotland.

So in dispensing with this classification convention, a single continuous narrative is offered which explores the interrelationship, or rather the tangential relationship, between regeneration and poverty in Scotland, in order to reveal not so much the policy differences, but rather the continuities that are highly evident within Scottish regeneration policy since the 1960s. That is not to deny change has occurred, for it clearly has, but by adopting this longer continuous timeframe it is also possible to reveal the long-standing continuities, often described as ‘path dependent’ trajectories, as well as the re-emergence of previous approaches, often offered in the guise of something new.

11 The main report and three smaller country reviews are all available at http://www.shu.ac.uk/research/cresr/
This national review first examines the long tradition within Scotland of pursuing overt physically focused regeneration initiatives while, at the same time, having the social and economic elements kept quite separate and distinct. Through attempting to create 'joined-up thinking', by encouraging the synergies of partnership working, different bodies were from the 1990s encouraged by government to come together to promote regeneration. In common with past practice, it initially adopted an area-based focus, with physical solutions still dominating. However, just in the last decade, both the domination of physical solutions and its area focus have all but disappeared, to be replaced by policy outcomes conceived nationally, but delivered locally, which prioritise the social and economic, and are delivered via mainstream local government funding and not dedicated resources earmarked by central government. So while the term regeneration still has a policy resonance, it is now harder to define what exactly that policy constitutes. In tracing this long slow policy transformation it is also interesting to consider just how core policy thinking towards regeneration has become to local authority strategic planning, as illustrated by community planning and now Single Outcome Agreements (SOAs) between local authorities and the Scottish Government. It is also important to see the synergies that exist with English policy, for although the terminology and approach may appear to differ, outcomes often closely align, although this could equally be said for European regeneration policy as a whole.
Physical focus

Adopting a slightly longer timeframe, for over eighty years central government in Scotland has chosen to intervene, in a variety of ways, to initiate regeneration as a means to tackle poor living conditions, and by implication poverty. As will be shown the differing theories about poverty, its causes and consequences, although often assumed within the stated policy objectives of regeneration, rarely found expression in the implied rationales for specific policy approaches. So addressing poverty per se has always been implied, but rarely features as an explicit ambition of regeneration policy. While in the past such interventions were administered through local government, with approval being controlled by government, from the 1970s there was a growing preference by government to utilise their own dedicated agencies and specified budgets. Localised and persistent poor housing conditions were now considered beyond the competence of local government. In the last decade, however, perhaps as a consequence of devolution local authorities have again come to the fore as the prime agents for regeneration, albeit now without additional dedicated central government funding.

Regeneration has also been distinct in having a long-standing policy commitment to area, or neighbourhood based initiatives, primarily delivering physical housing solutions. But again in the last decade this focus has gone. Previously, the approach could be characterised as ‘environmental determinism’, in that there was an underlying assumption that better physical environments act to ‘improve’ the people who reside within them, an approach dating back to the original slum clearance programmes undertaken in the mid-1930s in order to address both overcrowding and its association with ill health, especially tuberculosis. In fact ‘environmental determinism’ has strong roots in both planning and housing, being pioneered by Patrick Geddes and his use of ‘conservative surgery’ to regenerate Edinburgh’s Old Town at the turn of the 19th century (Robertson, 2012). Interestingly Geddes also tied social improvement into physical and environmental improvements through involving children’s play groups and community participation in these works (Haworth, 2000).

This long-standing physical focus of regeneration had powerful backing from professional property interests: architects, quantity surveyors, civil engineers, builders, planners and housing professionals. These interests were also well represented with the major central government funded bureaucracies whose raison d’être was primarily to pursue housing regeneration: in sequential order, the Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA), established in 1937, then the Housing Corporation in Scotland, from 1964, before Scottish Homes in 1989 and, latterly, Communities Scotland from 2001. With its abolition in 2008 there is no longer a dedicated central housing agency focused on this work, and this has had implications for both the scale and future locus of regeneration work. Both Edinburgh and Glasgow administer housing capital budgets provided by the Scottish...
Government, while all other authorities make bids for resources to government. Area-based housing regeneration, in large part, appears to have had its day.

Distinctive aspects of physical regeneration work, particularly land reclamation and improvement, were also pursued by the Scottish Development Agency (SDA), established in 1975, and Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB), created earlier in 1965. Both these Scottish Office economic development bodies were rebranded in 1991: the SDA became Scottish Enterprise (SE) and the HIDB, Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE). From that time until 2008 both bodies also operated a semi-independent network of Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) which sought to deliver local economic development within a defined geographic locality. Employment training and skills development also featured, albeit minimally, given SE emerged in 1991 from an amalgamation of the Manpower Services Commission / Scottish Training Agency and SDA, and Careers Scotland and SE in 2002. However, as of 2008 careers and training work was undertaken by Skills Development Scotland. Both the environmental works and skills training were rarely tied into housing regeneration initiatives, unless they were defined partners in a specific project or initiative, so, in large part, economic development ran largely independently of deprived localities, nowhere more so than in Glasgow (Robertson, 1998; Webster, 2000).

Community renewal

Paralleling the dominant physical housing approach there is also a long and often forgotten history of the Scottish Office ‘top slicing’ local government budgets to provide a separate pot of money from which social, or more accurately, distinct community dimensions of poverty and deprivation could be addressed. Politically and administratively this also allowed central government some insight and scope to offer direct assistance to places of poverty. The focus was on short-life projects which were, in the main, supported by a combination of community workers and local authority departments keen to extend their traditional reach and budgets (Taylor, 1988). The Urban Programme, introduced in 1968 throughout Britain, also known as Urban Aid, existed in Scotland until its funds were merged into the new Partnership Programme in 1995 (Taylor, 2002). In 1992/3 in Scotland a total of 1,534 projects were funded, to a tune of £80m (Taylor, 2002). Local government, which was required to contribute 25 per cent of any approved project costs, thus made up some £20m of contribution. Given the Scottish Homes budget at that time amounted to between £300 and £400m, with another £60m spent on its own housing stock, and the Scottish Enterprise budget was £350m, both of which embraced capital and revenue, this scale of funding was never as substantial (see Scottish Homes and Scottish Enterprise annual reports, 1992/3 to 1995/6).

Grants for Urban Aid had always been subject to a competitive bidding process, adjudicated by the Scottish Office. Eligible local authorities were those containing the ‘worst 10 per cent’ of Scotland’s Census enumeration districts (EDs), using a composite measure of social and economic disadvantage (Taylor, 1988). Either the local authority itself, or voluntary bodies supported by the local authority, could bid for and deliver an agreed project. Initially the emphasis was on ‘positive discrimination’ as determined by local authorities. Over time there was a subtle change to meeting local needs, something encouraged during the Conservative period by the Scottish Office which was keen to support projects managed by local community groups or voluntary organisations. In 1982/3 67 per cent of the programme was run by local authorities themselves, but by 1993/4 around 60 per cent were projects managed in this way (Scottish Office, 1993). Only half of the 600 annual bids that year secured funding (Scottish Office, 1993).
Urban Aid originated out of an UK interest in the US Federal Government’s ‘War on Poverty’ programme, initiated by the Democratic administration. This programme also generated an interest in educational disadvantage, best encapsulated by the famous Plowden Report which advocated ‘positive discrimination’ via skewing educational resources to poorer neighbourhoods through the declaration of Educational Priority Areas (HMSO, 1967). The publication of the National Children’s Bureau study ‘Born to fail?’ (Wedge and Prosser, 1973), given its widespread media coverage, reinforced the policy commitment to area-based ‘positive discrimination’ (Young, 1999).

An early example of this was the Ferguslie Park Community Development Programme (CDP), one of 12 established across the UK from 1968 onwards. Ferguslie was a classic ‘slum clearance’ tenemental council housing estate, build in 1930s (CDP, 1978a; Damer, 1974). Built to house the most ‘incorrigible’ tenants of Paisley Corporation, it had long been used as an allocations ‘dumping ground’, for those marginalised and in severe housing need, but effectively denied access to other council stock (Paisley CDP, 1978b; Clark, 1988; Mathews, 2012b). Through access to community workers the local community was to be supported to improve local housing conditions by campaigning for local authority investment. A similar campaign of action in the early 1970s, again drawing on Urban Aid monies, occurred in Possilpark, Glasgow, following the then Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath visit, given his personal shock at local housing conditions.

Perhaps Strathclyde Regional Council (SRC) evidences the most comprehensive illustration of how this approach was used in Scotland, via their now largely forgotten anti-poverty strategy ‘Social Strategy for the 1980s’ (SRC, 1983). The Regional Council, established in 1975 in the wake of the ‘positive discrimination’ agenda, sought to tackle multiple deprivation through adopting an explicit area-based focus, through declaring geographically defined Areas of Priority Treatment (APTs), in order that community-based interventions could be prioritised and implemented via Urban Aid monies. In total 45 such areas were designated, in the main within large peripheral council housing estates with a 10,000 plus population experiencing ‘official’ unemployment rates of over 20 per cent (Young, 1999). The vast majority of APTs were in Glasgow, with others scattered across the decaying industrial and mining heartlands of Ayrshire, Dunbartonshire, Lanarkshire and Renfrewshire.

Quite independent of the community regeneration work, primarily focused on these council housing estates, there was another entirely separate area-based housing improvement programme focused primarily on 19th century industrial districts, and specifically Glasgow, which still possessed a substantial residue of tenement slums which had eluded the city’s extensive clearance programme (Robertson, 1992). Housing Treatment Areas, enacted in 1969, were soon replaced by Housing Action Areas (HAAs) in 1974, which sought to bring about targeted basic area-based improvements via enhanced improvement and later repair grants. The focus of these awards was on statutorily defined Below Tolerable Standard (BTS) slum housing, properties that would have in the past been demolished. To support this programme the Housing Corporation in Scotland encouraged the growth of small community-based housing associations who improved, then rented out these properties to the previous residents (Robertson & Bailey, 1996). Many community workers, with direct Urban Aid experience, helped create these community-based associations (Robertson, 2012). Over the subsequent forty years, the quality of the renovation work increased, enhanced by new build housing, plus the addition of a variety of local social and employment facilities creating a unique and successful community approach to regeneration. Housing association HAA renewal work was joined, in the late 1980s, by six ‘community ownership’ pilots, targeted on a few places across Glasgow’s vast swath of peripheral council housing. Glasgow District Council had tried to create their own approach, utilising improvement grant monies, but financially
and politically the Scottish Office forced them into the housing association funding model (Clapham et al., 1991). And again, there was no direct tie up between housing investment and Urban Aid monies.

The evaluation of the entire Scottish HAA programme, involving the improvement of some 47,000 properties, noted the success of this Glasgow focused housing association approach, with low-income groups directly benefiting from the improved housing resulting from this investment, rather than being displaced as a result of ‘gentrification’. There were also other benefits noted, namely the creation of locally-based housing organisations which provided local residents with professional staff resources to pursue local improvement agendas with public officials, both locally and nationally. However, it was also noted that as a result of the associations’ allocation policies a localised concentration of poor households was emerging (Robertson and Bailey, 1996).

Success, but on different terms, was also recorded in relation to the other HAA programme, focused in Edinburgh, which utilised improvement grants solely for property owners. In this case younger high income groups moved in, inflating local house prices and enhancing the economic base of once deprived localities. The problem here was that the housing agency commissioning the evaluation, Scottish Homes, was unable to define what successful regeneration actually constituted. Hence these two approaches to regeneration, the Glasgow housing association one resulting in limited gentrification, and the Edinburgh one largely predicated on gentrification, were each considered a success (Bailey and Robertson, 1997). The neighbourhood focus, with local accountability to tenants and residents exercised through association management committees, is still strong in Glasgow, where these organisations now constitute the city’s largest social landlord grouping, owning some 50,000 units, just over half the city’s entire social housing stock.

So, in summary, Scotland’s long preferred approach to regeneration had focussed on improving poor quality pre-1919 tenement housing, initially in the 1930s via slum clearance procedures, which were then reactivated in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Later, the residue slum clearance programme became the focus of subsidised improvement grants. Both programmes were focused on defined small areas, or neighbourhoods. Quite separately there was an entirely distinct stream of regeneration work that had pioneered a distinctive community work focus, funded via Urban Aid. Although Urban Aid monies did support the Ferguslie Park CDP, the required renewal work depended on council funding, and while community workers did help develop Glasgow’s community-based housing associations, this was not directly Urban Aid funded. The then separation of local government into two tiers in the mid-1970s helped to institutionalise this separation. Regional Councils dealt with strategic level services such as education, planning and social work, and thus Urban Aid, while housing investment, whether council housing or private improvement grants, was a District Council function. Further, it was also politically hard for District Councils to admit that their previous solutions to both slum clearance and overcrowding, the small inner area clearance schemes and vast peripheral housing estates, now needed regeneration themselves. Grudging construction standards, a complete lack of place planning, plus the omission of basic community services such as schools, shopping and entertainment, now combined with rapid physical deterioration and high unemployment, the consequence of rapid de-industrialisation, to accelerate their demise. So although improved housing per se did produce a positive impact upon people’s quality of life and well-being, especially in relation to mental health (see Go Well, 2013), such an overtly physically dominant approach to regeneration had long been criticised for being too narrowly focussed, obscuring the need to adopt a more holistic approach incorporating both social and, crucially, economic aspects into the regeneration mix (Fyfe, 2009). For fifty years policy had
hardly altered, in that housing, economic development and latterly community development, pursued their own distinct agendas, but that was about to change.

Pioneering partnerships

Scottish regeneration policy was refocused by the Conservative administration’s ‘New Life for Urban Scotland’ (Scottish Office, 1988a), a decade after it came to power. This multi-agency, multi-sectorial project focused on four run-down and deprived housing estates, one of which was in the constituency of the then Scottish Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, and another was the Ward of Glasgow District Council leader Pat Lally (Kintrea, 1996). ‘New Life’ brought together the government’s housing, economic and training agencies, as well as relevant local authorities, under Scottish Office leadership, into a pioneering ‘partnership’ approach that pursued area-based regeneration within the peripheral council housing estates of Castlemilk, Glasgow; Ferguslie Park, Paisley; Wester Hailes, Edinburgh; and Whitfield, Dundee, over a decade from 1989. Rather than a separate budget being set for each estate, or for the partnerships in total, funding came via the partners existing budgets, albeit that in the case of Scottish Homes an earmarked budget was created.

In large measure this repeated an approach pioneered by the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project, introduced by the then Labour administration, which also ran for a decade, from 1976, involving £200m of public investment, the only real difference being the focus here was on an old industrial district, rather than large council estates. Arguably partnership working had emerged earlier, through the corporate planning principles pursued by Strathclyde Regional Council, used to produce its statutorily defined Regional Report (SRC, 1976). From that emerged the ‘Social Strategy for the Eighties’ which sought to operationalise this strategy via interdepartmental and agency working (SRC, 1983; Young, 1999).

Interestingly, evaluations of both ‘New Life’ and GEAR came to identical conclusions, namely that while physical housing renewal had proved highly successful, enhancing both living conditions and the wider environment, the social and economic dimensions languished far behind, in terms of both available resources and impacts (Deloitte et al., 1982; Donnison and Middleton, 1987; Cambridge Policy Consultants, 1999; Hayton, 1993; Turok and Hopkins, 1998). Two-thirds of the £485m spent on ‘New Life’ went on housing, either improving the 13,000 existing houses, or building new ones. Council tenure fell from 96 to 56 per cent, with housing associations rather than owner occupation being the main beneficiary (Cambridge Policy Consultants, 1999). A less dramatic but similar tenure shift occurred in GEAR, where associations grew at the expense of private renting and low cost owner occupation. Similar conclusions were also drawn by the NDC programme evaluation in England, in that holistic regeneration appeared best suited to physical, rather than economic, or social regeneration (McCarthy, 2007). Within the Scottish case this was hardly surprising, given the long history of physical renewal, and the fact that a dedicated housing agency, with a substantial annual budget and a proven delivery approach involving community-based housing associations and co-operatives, was responsible for delivering the housing outcomes. Other agencies, by contrast, found themselves out with their comfort zone, on a steep learning curve, pursuing an initiative which was never a core strategic priority. Stripping out physical investment in housing regeneration, the spend by these various regeneration initiatives on economic and social services of one kind or another was miniscule in relation to the inputs of mainstream providers in the fields of education, health, social welfare and employment (McGregor, 2009).

The percentage of people working within the East End did not alter over the ten years of the GEAR project, explained by the fact that most new jobs created went to people living outwith the local area, while major job losses persisted within heavy
industry (Donnison and Middleton, 1988). In 1977 only 36 per cent of the areas adult population and 40 per cent of household heads were working (SDA, 1978). In total 60 per cent of adult males had been unemployed for more than one year, and a high proportion of these were unskilled (SDA, 1978). By 1982, it was calculated there was a gross increase of 445 jobs within the defined GEAR boundaries, of which just 187 were local to that locality, a limited response to the 4,000 locally unemployed (McArthur, 1987).

Within Ferguslie, one of the subsequent ‘New Life’ Partnership Areas, the proportion of the working age population in employment did increase over the decade, from 28 to 41 per cent. In Whitfield, the change was stronger, from 42 to 62 per cent, whereas Castlemilk remained constant, at 38 to 36 per cent, while Wester Hailes actually fell in from 57 to 48 per cent (Cambridge Policy Consultants, 1999). Isolating wider regional economic effects again proved impossible, with local population dynamics being thought to be a contributory factor within Wester Hailes, with those securing employment moving out to be replaced by those unemployed. However, such turnover, or selective migration, assumed within deprived neighbourhoods, has recently been questioned by UK research using Census data (Bailey and Livingstone, 2008). Building on previous work it shows that by controlling for age, in that young people move more until they settle down to have their own families, then turnover within deprived neighbourhoods is not noticeably higher than other places (Bailey and Livingstone, 2007).

Partnership working was also explicitly based on the principle of resident involvement, drawing on self-help ideology and lessons from previous community-based renewal projects. However, the evaluation concluded that more thought and work was needed to address inequalities in resources between the community representatives and other partners (Cambridge Policy Consultants, 1999). Drawing on evidence gleaned from the Ferguslie Partnership, Kintrea (1996) found that, in the early years, community interests had been largely set aside, while the more powerful members of the partnership pursued their own agendas. The reason for this was not simply that community interests were ignored, but rather that the political objectives of government, the complexity of the project and its timeframe all conspired to prevent meaningful local engagement. This also concurred with Hastings’ (1996) findings, when examining both Castlemilk and Wester Hailes, that partnership working was largely a hypothetical concept rather than a reality, given that simultaneous reciprocal or mutual transformations between all the partners was absent. Again there were strong parallels with previous criticisms levelled at participation practices pursued within the GEAR project (Nelson, 1980).

**Economic disconnect**

De-industrialisation and economic restructuring were core considerations in explaining the rapid degeneration and consequent ballooning of unemployment in West Central Scotland, and other old industrial districts, throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Keating and Boyle, 1986). Macroeconomic policy was, however, kept quite separate from regeneration policy and programmes (Robertson, 1998). Since the advent of Special Areas, in the 1930s, to provide industrial estates and develop the initial New Towns in the immediate post-war years, economic policy had been tightly controlled by the Scottish Office, and its economic development bodies: Locate in Scotland, the five New Town Development Corporations and its dedicated economic agencies, whether the SDA, its successor Scottish Enterprise and their then Local Enterprise Company (LEC) network (Boyle, 1993; Moore and Booth, 1989).

As previously touched upon, employment, training and economic development has never been a core component of Scottish regeneration practice, rather it has tended to be pursued separately. Scotland did not have an equivalent to Urban
Development Corporations, at least until the creation of Urban Regeneration Companies in the mid-2000s. Ever since the 1930s the Scottish Office had kept economic planning and its delivery quite separate and distinct from regeneration. The SDA, established in 1975, was given two roles, that of promoting sectorial developments within the Scottish economy and addressing the problems of so-called ‘stress areas’ such as the Garnock Valley, Clydebank and Glasgow’s East End (Keating and Boyle, 1986; McCarthy, 2007). The SDA saw its role primarily in pursuing sectorial economic more familiar to industrial economists (Wannop and Leclerc, 1987). The agency's first Chief Executive was reluctant to accept responsibility for co-ordinating the GEAR project, as he considered it diversionary (Wannop and Leclerc, 1987). So although, at face value, GEAR appeared to link area economic development with regeneration ambitions, the SDA was keen to disassociate itself from this objective (Keating and Boyle, 1986; McCarthy, 2007). The only regeneration projects the SDA actively managed were those where they took the lead: the Garnock Valley Task Force, the Maryhill Corridor Project, Glasgow, the Leith Project in Edinburgh, the Blackness project in Dundee, and later, Dundee Waterfront and Glasgow’s Crown Street Regeneration in the Gorbals. These projects, unlike GEAR, had clear objectives, agreed timeframes and defined partner responsibilities (Gulliver, 1884). That said, environmental improvement which amounted to a significant element of any area-based initiative was an activity where there was a degree of joint working between the SDA and other regeneration actors, who often acted as the Agency’s delivery vehicle for such work.

Further, building on their experiences in developing Enterprise Zones, on the site of the old Singer sewing machine factory within Clydebank being the best known, a small number of identical advanced workspace units were constructed by the SDA in the GEAR, Leith and Maryhill projects. As with the Enterprise Zones, there was a criticism that these failed to generate new employment, but rather merely relocated existing businesses from outwith the defined regeneration area (McArthur, 1988).

Vocational training, outwith the mainstream education system, was not distinctly Scottish. In 1964 a network of powerful, statutory, independent Industry Training Boards (ITB) were established in response to the perceived failure of employer-led voluntarism to secure an adequate supply of skilled labour (Anderson and Fairley, 1983). While the largest ITBs treated Scotland as an operating area, most did not, with policies developed for the UK as a whole. In time they were criticised for not taking account of regional policy, which at that time covered Scotland entirely, as well as not understanding small firms, nor local labour markets (Fairley, 1989). The Manpower Services Commission (MSC) was brought into being in 1974 to co-ordinate ITBs, but quickly had to respond to the growing problem of youth unemployment. Again, this was a UK body, based in Sheffield, and answerable to the UK Parliament, not the Scottish Office with its economic development powers, hence the concern that MSC training programmes were disconnected from economic development priorities (Brown and Fairley, 1987).

In December 1988 two government White Papers (DoE, 1988; Scottish Office, 1988b) proposed radical changes to economic policy, by advocating supply side economics and stressing the need to create and sustain a flexible labour market with vocational training to explicitly addressing the needs of industry and business. In 1991 both the SDA and HIDB were abolished, and combined their responsibilities and powers with the former MSC into two new bodies, Scottish Enterprise (SE) and Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE). Both agencies were legally required to decentralise their operations and budgets to local partnerships or companies, bringing about the 22 Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) network. The SE budget for 1992/93 amounted to £449m, with Glasgow, Lanarkshire and Edinburgh & Lothians LECs taking some 40 per cent (Fairley and Lloyd, 1995). In 1993/94 SE spent £395m on its four programmes: £137 on enterprise, £88m on environment, £79m on youth training and
£91m on adult training. In that same year HIE spent £1m on community action grants, £17m on marketing and projects, £5m on environmental renewal, £13m on training and £30m on enterprise assistance (Fairley and Lloyd, 1995). Training monies came directly from UK government sources, but as unemployment declined in the 1990s, so did these monies.

So within 20 years the Scottish Office had moved from having oversight of industrial policy to covering all the main aspects of economic development and also training. Yet despite this there was still a disconnect between economic development and training goals. Training under the LECs was geared to the interests of local businesses, and at the same time the strategic emphasis of SE and HIE was on business interests. There was a further disconnect, in that both organisations focused on business not welfare, as regeneration policy found itself characterised.

The economic initiatives pursued within the four ‘New Life’ Partnership Areas focused primarily on training and education for the young and long-term unemployed. From the mid-1990s there was also a concerted attempt within Scottish Homes, as the core regeneration body, to promote local labour clauses with the main contractors and their sub-contractors of projects they funded, so that capital monies spent on housing regeneration could be seen to have a locally focused economic spin off. However, EU tender competition rules and the actual limited implementation of such clauses ensured they never became a mainstream element of regeneration practice. So despite partnership working becoming an explicit part of regeneration projects, Scottish Enterprise and their LEC network, were able to keep themselves at arm’s length from those engaged in what was primarily housing renewal.

At this point, mention should again be made of Strathclyde Regional Council’s ‘Social Strategy’ and its attempts, again via Urban Aid, to support the development of community businesses, now termed social enterprises. Strathclyde Community Business, funded by the Council, employed 30 staff to encourage and advise local community organisations, in estates suffering high unemployment how to establish commercial ventures (Young, 1999). By the mid-1980s there were some 50 companies, employing 25 unemployed people, on average, who were additionally supported by a board composed of ten local people (Young, 1999). The short-term nature of funding and the types of businesses activity undertaken, such as ground maintenance and security of construction sites, ensured few if any survived. Paralleling this was the establishment of the Wise Group in 1983, which developed a major training programme for the unemployed on the back of a major home insulation contract involving a large proportion of Glasgow District Council’s 175,000 council homes. This intermediate labour market programme focused on council housing with a poor thermal standard, at that time almost ubiquitous in Glasgow given poor construction and minimal on-going maintenance. It was not specifically targeted to renewal area. From this the Wise Group went on to develop a nationwide profile in providing training and received many accolades for its work by the New Labour Government in the 1990s.

Economic development was seen by governments of whatever hue, and its economic agencies, to be primarily about ensuring future economic successes, building opportunities, whereas regeneration was characterised as being about doing the necessary to manage the negative consequences of economic failure. Regeneration steps in to counter ‘market failure’. But Scottish Enterprise saw no role for economic development within regeneration areas. Scottish Enterprise, throughout the 1990s, operated an economic shorthand for each of Scotland’s four cities: Edinburgh – ‘Finance and bio-tech’; Aberdeen - ‘Oil and renewables’; Dundee - ‘Biotech and games’, and Glasgow - ‘Need’. Such labelling reveals much about prevailing attitudes within the government’s economic development agency, an attitude which has been consistent throughout the post-war era. When the Glasgow
Development Agency, the city’s LEC, presented a business plan which sought to engage more fully with regeneration areas the Scottish Enterprise Board failed to endorse it. Their opinion was that funding regeneration areas was simply ‘putting good money after bad’ (personal interview 2). Both Scottish Enterprise and its predecessor saw their role as being one of focusing on economic ‘opportunities’, and outwith a few specific service areas, such a city centre commercial property and tourism, Glasgow was not viewed in that light (McCarthy, 2007). Given the city had long been the prime focus of regeneration activity, being the most deprived city in the UK, the omission of this economic dimension would always be highly problematic, findings that accord with recent work by North and Syrett (2008) who argue that neighbourhood renewal in England has been hamstrung by the lack of integration with economic development at wider spatial scales. The notion that sustained employment could be generated on the back of major regeneration projects occurring across the city, so-called ‘housing led regeneration’, was fanciful given the scale of the city’s problems. Yet this was one of the few economic cards Glasgow was dealt.

So politically and administratively central government saw itself as being in control of the higher order functions of government, most notably economic policy, with local government being left to sort the more mundane administrative tasks, in the main, associated with delivering social services. While central government controlled the purse strings and modus operandi of regeneration, both in its physical and social guises, economic aspects outwith training and skills were kept distinct and separate (Rae, 2011). The Scottish Office, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, irrespective of the administration’s political hue, also effectively denied that unemployment and associated deprivation was a structural issue. Rather they preferred socio-pathological explanations, which viewed area degeneration as being caused, in the main, by those who were resident (Hastings, 2000; Mathews, 2010). While CDPs and the Inner Areas Studies (DoE, 1977) foregrounded structural explanations for urban decay, this rhetoric was not accepted by the incoming Conservative administration, nor later by New Labour.

Sticking or changing

As already noted, the physical, social and economic aspects of regeneration were the responsibility of different policy and practice actors, whether in central government, its various agencies, or in local government. They had never operated to a commonly agreed format, thus the high degree of organisational duplication and disagreements between these different organisations, or parts of organisations, over budgets, responsibilities and approaches to pursue. Thus historically the administration of regeneration involved extensive and expensive bureaucracy which, in turn, generated further complex administration structures and what at times appeared to be a perpetual stream of organisational change and restructuring, which was both the cause of and reaction to new policy initiatives. Partnership working was the means to address such strategic and organisational problems and had become the regeneration norm, but has undergone a series of subtle changes both politically and organisationally since its introduction under ‘New Life’; if not GEAR.

Traditionally government, its agencies and local government had worked together on regeneration matters, but largely independently, with the Scottish Office setting

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2 To help inform and initially scope out this review eight interviews were conducted with people who had a direct involvement in planning and funding different aspects of regeneration work. One had been a senior elected member in a Regional Council, one held a senior planning position in the Scottish Government, two had previously headed-up regeneration agencies, three had held senior positions in Scottish Homes/Communities Scotland, on the capital planning and funding operations while the last held a senior managerial position in a Local Enterprise Company.
strategic objectives and funding priorities, while local authorities spent the emergent budgets on different projects. Under the Conservatives greater use was made of agencies to deliver programmes, a practice that had a longstanding history within Scottish Office administration. What changed was scale, in that the Conservative administration considered agencies to be a more effective means of delivering on their policy objectives, especially the highly politicised arena of housing policy. This was, in large part, party political, in that throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s Scottish local authorities were, in the main Labour controlled, while the UK government, and thus Scottish Office administration was Conservative. Given their ultimate control of housing and regeneration budgets, Conservative administrations assumed the lead role, an approach greatly resented by Labour local authorities, who considered themselves the legitimate authority in determining housing and regeneration priorities within their locality.

‘New Life’ added further to this tension because, in paralleling Action for Cities in England (HMSO, 1988), a strongly Conservative, if not neo-liberal ideology emerged, arguing that Scotland had become overly dependent on the State through the housing and benefits system, impeding ‘natural’ entrepreneurial activity (Scottish Office, 1988a; 1988b; Kintrea, 1996; Hastings, 2000). To address such failings, a partnership of private and public sectors would be created, charged with involving affected communities. These communities would be made responsible for themselves, and this, in turn, would reinvigorate their entrepreneurial spirit through active business involvement, an emphasis on skills training and extra financial support for start-up companies (Scottish Office, 1988a; Mathews, 2010). There was an ideological tie up here with the creation of SE and HIE, as discussed earlier (Scottish Office, 1988b). Interestingly, this focus chimes with Deakin and Edwards (1993) view that regeneration policy was perceived as a route to develop an ‘enterprise culture’ ideology, and Raco’s (2009) later work on the politics of aspiration underpinning New Labour urban policy. Regeneration was thus spearheading an ideological crusade, and in the process the language employed to describe this policy held with adopted pathological explanations of urban deprivation (Hastings, 1996; 2000).

So there is little surprise that this approach, combining partnership working and social pathology, moved into the next generation of area-based regeneration initiatives, the Priority Partnership Areas (PPAs). Mirroring the initial partnerships they stuck with the more holistic view of regeneration, involving identical economic, social and physical solutions. However, rather than government selecting their preferred locations for intervention, local authorities and their partners were invited to submit plans for partnership working within a specific area. Local need had to be demonstrated, so any PPA required to be within the most disadvantaged 10 per cent Census districts in Scotland. In addition, bids were to be judged on the quality of the proposals and the extent to which they demonstrated partnership working, within a local strategic context.

Securing funding was however competitive, mirroring both City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget models in England (Hastings, 1996). Out of 29 submissions, only 12 were approved for ten year funding, causing further disquiet amongst local authorities who argued the selection process was unfair. This produced a review of unsuccessful bids, which concluded the need for clearer guidelines and greater process transparency (Turok and Hopkins, 1997; Taylor et al., 1999). Interestingly, it also reported that 14 of the unsuccessful 17 bids were already operating some form of partnership arrangement to take forward the proposed regeneration work. Community and local business representation was, however, less evident. Roberts (1996) described such partnerships as ‘impermanent alliances’, formed for the immediate purpose of leveraging out comprehensively allocated public sector resources. The political furore, however, resulted in a further nine smaller
scale projects receiving Urban Programme funding, now re-badged as the Regeneration Programme.

An earlier review of the Urban Programme which, as noted previously, funded Urban Aid projects, argued for a more strategic focus, by co-ordinating and integrating with other projects at the local level (Scottish Office, 1993). Henceforth, future funding would be required to combine with other initiatives pursued by public, private and voluntary partnerships (Scottish Office, 1993). Subsequent applications to the Urban Programme would thus require local authorities to specify just how the project contributed to the local authorities wider planning strategy, thus effectively changing the basis of this distinct source of regeneration funding; a community resource for poor and deprived neighbourhoods became part of physical regeneration. This also helps explains the increased funding secured by Scottish Homes during this period, up to 1996.

It was at this time, and in part because of the increase in Scottish Homes funding, that an overtly housing focused initiative sought to deliver housing led-regeneration to run-down areas across Scotland. A total of 15 Small Urban Renewal Initiatives (SURIs) were launched in three waves between 1990 and 1995. Each sought to expand housing choice and quality, while levering in both public and private funding through a multi-agency approach (Pawson et al., 1998). As a housing venture, it succeeded in physical terms, as conditions improved and tenure was diversified. This was achieved by focussing attention and resources on places long ignored by Scottish policy. These new housing developments also had a socio-economic impact, both in terms of generating short-term construction employment, and through changing the local social mix, given the advent of mixed tenure (Pawson et al., 1998). However, the evaluation again noted the weak linkages between housing renewal and economic development, in that apart from construction employment economic development failed to feature. Inadequate attention was also spent on baseline and monitoring data limiting the capacity to evaluate. Finally, the commitment between partners was considered weak, largely because of this programmes ‘top down’ imposition, which also ensured the relative absence of community participation (Pawson et al., 1998).

From 1997, with the return of Labour governments in both the UK, and, in particular, in the re-created Scottish Parliament from 1999, there was a strong political desire to re-position local government as the key local strategic vehicle, in planning renewal and service delivery, while moving away from government agencies dictating what should be done. Such agencies were now increasingly expected to work on better aligning their strategic priorities with those of local government, through further initiatives to develop partnership working. That said, budgets were still kept separate, thus ensuring continued horse-trading over projects and commitments. Over time, government’s reliance upon agencies, both as strategic and delivery vehicles began to wane, and has now all but disappeared. But before this happened there was a brief resurrection of the old Urban Aid ethos and focus, reflecting its strong local authority political heritage, with the advent of Social Inclusion Partnerships (SIPs).

Two years after the change of government, the remaining PPAs and RPAs were rolled into the SIPs. Regeneration policy became key to the Scottish Executive’s agreed social policy, under the Labour Liberal Democrat administration. The continuity of policy is well illustrated by the consultation document ‘Social Exclusion in Scotland’ (Scottish Office, 1998) where it states: “government is committed to a comprehensive approach to area regeneration ... to improve the life chances of people living in some of the most deprived communities ... The policy is based upon New Life for Urban Scotland partnerships which have effectively tackled many of the problems of social exclusion by adopting a holistic multi-agency approach” (Scottish Office, 1998: 4). This accords with the earlier orthodoxy accorded to Scottish
regeneration, which argued continuity, rather than change, and success, never failure (McCrone, 1991; Hayton, 1999). Given such positivity the lack of a PPA evaluation, to provide evidence of this success is surprising. The evaluation of the Regeneration Programme, which focused on organisational structures and modes of working, proved lukewarm (Cambridge Economic Associates, 2001). It found that partnership working had brought considerable organisational benefits, although the nature and involvement of partners was highly variable. Further, mainstream budget bending by partners within the nine target areas was considered both slow and variable, leaving them to conclude more progress needed to be made.

Donald Dewar, then Scottish Secretary and subsequently Scotland’s first, First Minister viewed SIPs as core to promoting social justice. At their launch he stated: "Scottish circumstances differ from England in that those suffering exclusion … are disproportionately concentrated in specific communities, and there has been more experience of effective urban regeneration policies originally pioneered in Scotland and maintained in later years by local government and others" (Dewar, 1998: 1). Building on established arrangements and experience, the emphasis was to be on the most needy members of society; co-ordination and filling the gaps between existing programmes; and, finally, attempting to prevent people becoming socially excluded. There was also a feeling that the goals were shared between both tiers of government, and that communities would also be tied in as full partners (McCarthy, 1999). This also chimes with the belief that Scotland is a more socially just society, when compared to England, despite evidence showing both nations display remarkably similar levels of social inequality, if London and the South East are excluded from the analysis (Bell and Eiser, 2013).

While funding for both PPAs and RPAs came from the Urban Programme, SIPs budgets came from a new fund, the £345m Community Regeneration Fund, albeit that this was largely made up from the old Urban Programme monies, and a £100m top-sliced from Scottish Homes (Scottish Executive, 2002). Investment in area-based SIPs stuck with needs-based criteria, but in future this would be derived from a newly created Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (SiMD) which more accurately calculated deprivation levels, based on a specially created index (Gibb et al., 1999; Lloyd, 2002; McCarthy, 1999). There was also to be a strong emphasis on measuring outputs. Tangible improvements would be measured through utilising indicators of economic and social change to trace the improving conditions for these most disadvantaged communities (SIPs Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, 1998).

The programme goals, the selection of targeted areas, plus the retention of competition for resources, led McCarthy (2007) to argue SIPs closely mirrored the English New Deal for Communities (NDCs). However, much has been made of the distinctive inclusion focus outlined by ‘Social Justice: A Scotland where everyone matters’, in preference to social exclusion, the term applied in England (Scottish Office, 1999; Lupton, 2013). This was essentially a semantic point, in that inclusion was employed to indicate incorporation within mainstream society, whereas exclusion suggested social distancing. The actual programme focus north and south of the border was, thus, broadly similar.

In terms of scale, the 21 pre-existing area-based SIPs were carried forward into this revised program (but given their original starting date most had concluded their work by the end of 2003) and a further 14 area-based projects were added drawing directly from SiMD data. Further, a more transparent and engaging selection process involving the newly created Social Inclusion Network, composed of selected regeneration professionals who made recommendation to the Scottish Executive. In addition to these area-based SIPs, 14 Thematic SIPs were introduced, focusing on young people: one seeking to help Glasgow women out of prostitution (Routes Out), while two covered minority ethnic communities (FRAE Fife and the Glasgow Anti-
Racist Alliance). There were no projects covering disability, however, nor people with addiction issues (Macpherson, 2006; Macpherson et al., 2007). So while promoted as being innovative, and evidence based, the retention of competitive bidding and the broadening focus arguably marked a return to their Urban Aid roots.

The core ambition of ‘Social Inclusion – Opening the Door to a Better Scotland’ (Scottish Executive, 2002b) was achieving social justice for all, with particular targeted strategies for the poorest places. This contrasted with England where regeneration strategies focused solely on the poorest communities (Lupton, 2013). The distinctiveness of Scottish policy, at this time, was characterised as being less about transforming areas, through major investment, and more about filling gaps between existing programmes (Lupton, 2013). While it is correct to say the Scottish approach built on longer established city-wide partnerships, in contrast with England, the actual focus and investment, up till 2006, was still predominantly area-based.

Others make a valid point that both PPAs and SIPs articulated a stronger commitment to community empowerment. Cameron and Davoudi (1998) argue policy had moved away from income distribution and defining what constitutes an adequate level of income, to one involving a critical appreciation of the complexities of social and institutional restructuring, dis-empowerment and community capacity building. This chimes with Pearce (1993) who had earlier argued the policy framework had to be about the real delegation of power and responsibility to those communities experiencing poverty. Empowerment, as noted below, did not, however, emerge as a strong feature in SIPs evaluations.

Further, at this time ‘Better Communities in Scotland: Closing the gap’ (Scottish Executive, 2002a) saw securing higher incomes as a prime goal, given lack of access to employment had been long noted as the dominant indicator of exclusion (McGregor and McConnachie, 1998; McGregor et al., 1988). Again, the disconnect between the policy rhetoric and its reality of its implementation, is revealed, in that the emergent projects did not overtly focus on employment and skills. As noted earlier, the LEC network, which had core responsibility for training, undertook this work outwith the area focus of the SIPs framework.

Leading up to issuing the policy paper, ‘Social Justice: A Scotland where everyone matters?’ (Scottish Executive, 2006). ODS Consulting (2006) undertook an overarching evaluation of the entire SIPs programme drawing evidence from a series of 27 separate evaluations carried out in 2003 on each SIP which had been established in 1999.

Collectively SIPs adopted a catholic approach to defining ‘regeneration’: activities embraced employability, improving health outcomes as well as traditional housing and environmental improvements. But again it was the physical improvements, housing constructed or improved, that proved tangible and thus measurable outcomes. Delivering on the wider social benefits still proved elusive. A collective lack of meaningful local baseline data ensured that measuring performance proved hard, if not impossible, as it was not possible to determine delivery on agreed objectives (ODS Consulting, 2006). The Core Compulsory Indicators, to be universally applied within all area-based SIPs, also failed as many did not have the skills, time, nor inclination to undertake the demanded data collection and analysis. So while data existed on the many thousands of individuals who had been involved in, and probably benefited from SIP projects, there was limited evidence as to the extent to which these projects and such participation actually acted to reduce social exclusion. It was also found that some of the agreed objectives could not be met using only the resources available to the SIP. In common with the previous Regeneration Programme, again the evaluations had difficulty in identifying if mainstream budgets had been bent to add support to this work. Locality budgeting,
badged as ‘community budgeting’ was initially seen as a means to identify such expenditure, but was abandoned following a pilot in part of Glasgow’s vast Easterhouse estate. There was also a pilot ‘participatory budgeting’ exercise pursued in the Govanhill district of Glasgow, involving £200k (Harkins and Egan, 2012). Joint budgeting, although remaining elusive and largely untried, is considered to be a necessary development within the Christie Commission recommendations to improve the delivery of public services.

Partnership working had developed and improved, but there was still a lack of cross cutting approaches. Evaluations contained substantial information on community engagement, community capacity building and the use of the Community Engagement Fund. However, the link between these activities and the extent to which it made a difference had not been developed. Further, while engaging with communities was also felt to have improved, the ‘new’ SIPs were failing to address equality issues, despite extensive guidance on this issue (ODS Consulting, 2006).

There was also evidence that a number of SIPs struggled from the outset to establish organisational structures, re-allocate or recruit staff, or implement a framework to allocate project funding. There were also major weaknesses in setting targets and objectives and measuring performance identified at both local and national levels. While there was evidence that SIPs had supported projects that had developed good practice, evidence of innovation was less frequent.

So despite a more robust selection process, a contractual requirement for an agreed implementation plan, and annual structured reporting to both the Scottish Executive and Communities Scotland (the successor to Scottish Homes), the inability of regeneration projects to measure outcomes still characterised their work. Although blind to their wider influence and impacts, SIPs were confident that partnership working, community engagement and the perceived potential to bend mainstream budgets to benefit poorer neighbourhoods would, over time, improve matters. Such evidence also implied that the actual management of regeneration had, in twenty years, become as much of a goal as what was being delivered.

Planning not intervening

By 2006 partnership working had become the mantra for local government management, a narrative that gathered pace throughout the 1990s, before becoming legally defined as Community Planning, under the Local Government in Scotland Act, 2003. This prescribed approach to joint working was agreed between the then Scottish Office and Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA), immediately following the Labour Liberal Coalition victory in the first Scottish Parliament elections in 1999 (Rogers et al., 2000). Subsequently, successive governments have built upon this mode of working: the Labour Liberal Coalition (2003-07), the SNP Minority Administration (2007-11) and SNP Majority Government (2011 to present).

What is peculiar about Community Planning was the speed by which it became mainstreamed and packaged as ‘the’ sole means to achieve ‘strategic planning’ within local authority jurisdictions, now defined as ‘communities’ (Robertson, 2001). In part, it was an organisational response to what had become a congested policy and delivery environment, created during the long period of UK Conservative government. The other driver was New Labour’s commitment to social justice.

One consequence of this change was the creation of the Better Neighbourhood Services Fund (BNSF), which ran between 2001 to 2005, and was designed to help local authorities and their ‘community planning partners’ deliver real and substantial service improvements within twelve Pathfinder Areas, to narrow the gap between disadvantaged communities and the wider population (Sheil and Clark, 2004). The
focus was on key ‘inclusion’ themes: children and young people; community safety; employability; care for older people; and health. The initial three-year £90m fund received an extra £32m to fund a year extension. Again, as with SIPs progress was to be measured against agreed outcomes set for each project, through what was termed a Local Outcome Agreement (LOA).

In reviewing progress Sheil and Clark (2004: 12) noted that designing customised LOAs, to meet the needs of particular communities, proved challenging.

“Consultation, baseline information, and considerable reflection on the most appropriate outcome indicators are required. These issues were not fully appreciated at the outset, and more guidance and training about how to approach the task of designing an outcome based programme would have been desirable.”

Despite this concern the evidence-based approach was endorsed, as it offered: “a coherent and logical framework within which to develop new policies to combat disadvantage and subsequently assess their effectiveness”. While recognising these demands and challenges, several participating authorities stated that they had now adopted a similar approach in other areas of their work suggesting that corporate planning and bending mainstream budgets was now on the agenda.

This was later developed into a parallel policy initiative, the Scottish Executive’s Closing the Opportunity Gap (CtOG), which again explored how mainstream services could be better co-ordinated to tackle social exclusion. Under CtOG three aims and six higher level objectives were set, which then tied into 10 lower level objectives, all of which were evaluated over seven local authorities. The resulting evaluation, in common with those in regeneration, proved inconclusive, given the lack of available monitoring data. However, better systems and planning in the future would ensure this was addressed, so the focus again was on process not impact (McKendrick et al, 2007).

Another example of where this new orthodoxy initially came together was with the creation of the Community Regeneration Fund (CRF), which allocated £318m in 2006/07 to disadvantaged neighbourhoods, and was tied to local authority Regeneration Outcome Agreements (ROA), which ran briefly from 2005-08, before being incorporated into Single Outcome Agreements (SOA), which has become the core tool for co-ordinating central and local government strategic planning. At this time all remaining SIPs were integrated into Community Planning Partnerships, with funding coming from CRF, which was composed of the previous SIP and BNSF funds, plus the mopping up of some other regeneration monies.

A vision for delivering social justice was presented by Social Justice: A Scotland where everyone matters? (Scottish Executive, 2006b). It argued that, in the past, strategies to tackle poverty and injustice had been more about places than people. While both mattered this policy advocated a lifecycle approach to regeneration target setting so that deprivation would be stopped from becoming “a way of life and being passed on through the generations” (Scottish Executive, 2006: 7) So in place of area-based interventions the focus moved on to on every child, young person, family, older person and community. Delivering social justice thus demanded modern, effective government that promoted social justice across all areas of government, so that: “achieving our targets will be about more than how much we spend. It will be about how we spend, whom we work with and how we organise for change” (Scottish Executive, 2006: 7). Again this ties back to both the CtOG work, and that of CRF noted earlier.
Given this commitment to addressing social justice it is surprising the accompanying regeneration policy statement *People and place* (Scottish Executive, 2006a) adopts more of an economic opportunity focus in promoting regeneration, rather than the more traditional emphasis upon addressing need (McCarthy, 2007). This very much reflected the prevailing mood of the day, given the unprecedented period of sustained economic growth. Malcolm Chisholm, Minister for Housing and Communities, adopted the descriptors of people, place, partnership and prosperity to announce the combined regeneration budget, encompassing the three government agencies charged with this task - SE, HIE and CS - of £2.4bn for the period 2005/06 to 2008/09, within which £123m was allocated for the City Growth Fund, supporting renewal ventures in Scotland’s six cities, and just £318m allocated to disadvantaged neighbourhoods. It also indicates a degree of political satisfaction, in that poverty was now on the wane:

“Since 1997 significant progress has been made in tackling poverty across Scotland – 630,000 people ... have been lifted out of absolute poverty and the number of children in absolute poverty has halved. Scotland’s employment rate is up too – up 3.7 per cent on 1999 and, at 75 per cent, above the UK average for the first time in a generation. Meanwhile, unemployment is down by nearly a third. But … while good progress has been made, there are still considerable differences in quality of life between the most deprived areas and the rest of Scotland – differences which compound and reinforce each other at the neighbourhood level. (Scottish Executive, 2006a: 9)

So this also goes some way to explain the downplaying of Scottish policy distinctiveness, and the stated desire to mirror the English SRB approach. Regeneration was now seen as core to future prosperity and economic growth, so encouraging private partnership in executing such work was crucial (Rae, 2011). Both the City Growth Fund, which emerged out of the *Cities Review* (Scottish Executive, 2003), and Urban Regeneration Companies (URCs), also reveals changed thinking as to what constituted regeneration and how it should be pursued (Shiel and Smith-Milne, 2007).

URCs were a new area-based renewal initiative, but their public private company model had long been a feature of Scottish public policy. As distinct ‘business’ entities they were expected to operate at arms' length from the partner organisations when delivering physical, economic and social regeneration, within a specific neighbourhood (Sheil and Smith-Milne, 2007). In taking forward their strategic overview, this shared set of objectives and envisaged outcomes had also to embrace the affected communities themselves. Initially three were created between 2005 and 2007, namely, Clydebank, Craigmillar and Raploch. They were later joined by three others: Inverclyde, Irvine Bay and the Clyde Gateway project.

What was new was that this model pursued an overtly private property-led approach to regeneration, whereby public investment, in the form of land, development capital and also involving some complementary social housing investment, would be used to stimulate private housing investment. Land sale receipts, arising from the staged sale of owner occupied housing, would then be recycled back into the URC. While these public private partnerships were obliged to produce a ROA, across defined economic, social and environmental objectives, the Scottish Executive did not see the URC as being responsible for the ‘direct’ delivery of the outcomes related to the social inclusion themes of worklessness, employability, health, education and quality of life (Sheil and Smith-Milne, 2007). The URCs core role was that of regeneration catalyst, bringing partners together to ensure that opportunities created by physical regeneration were planned and maximised, through drawing in private investment from the use of existing public funding streams, or agencies.
By the time the URCs were into their development phase the ‘global financial crisis’ struck, bringing about the collapse of the private housing market, and with it their business model. Social housing investment then fell away, a consequence of related deep public expenditure cuts. Clyde Gateway is still functioning, given its role in delivering the 2014 Commonwealth Games Sports Village and associated infrastructure, largely on the site of the old GEAR project. At the same time it seeks to create new business opportunities arising from the M74 extension which sliced through a large chunk of derelict land in Glasgow’s east end. It accounts for 20 per cent of the recently announced Regeneration Capital Fund Grants for 2014/16, with Inverclyde and Irvine Bay making up five per cent of the £27.6m fund (Scottish Government, 2013). Five of the 23 funded projects are in Glasgow. The fund was developed in partnership with COSLA and local authorities, to support projects that will deliver large-scale improvements to deprived areas, and is effectively all that remains of area-based regeneration. The only other major area based regeneration currently being carried out is by the Glasgow Housing Association (now part of the Wheatley Group), the body that took over ownership of Glasgow’s council housing stock, following the successful tenant ballot and associated extinguishing off its outstanding £1bn capital debt by the Treasury.

Drowning, not waving

With the introduction of Single Outcome Agreements (SOA), by the in-coming SNP Minority Administration, the re-engineering of local government strategic planning was complete. SOAs were the logical successor to Pathfinder ROAs and LOAs, which in turn drew from CtOG and CRF. Scotland’s 32 Community Planning Partnerships were now required to tie into this outcome-focused approach, whereby local government was expected to show how they contribute to the Scottish Government’s fifteen defined strategic objectives, as detailed in the National Performance Framework (Scottish Government, 2007). Paralleling this, the SNP drew up a Concordat with the COSLA whereby, for agreeing to direct their activities to meeting the government’s strategic objectives, and for not increasing the Council Tax, authorities would be free to determine their own priorities, and all government enforced ‘ring fenced’ of budgets was removed (Scottish Government & COSLA, 2007).

Local government were now free to set its own local priorities, unhindered by central dictate or ‘ring fenced’ budgeting, as long as they could show how they were contributing to meeting the Scottish Governments strategic objectives. The SOAs are thus expected to further refine strategic planning and co-ordination, with the resulting corporate planning document being the core tool to enhance tangible ‘partnerships’ and ‘joint working’ (Scottish Government, 2012a). Local authorities and its partners were also expected to co-ordinate and bend their mainstream budgets in order to improve outputs which would target specified priorities, that could either be a distinct deprived neighbourhood, or a particular priority group, as long as either could be linked directly back to the Scottish Government’s initial 15, now 16, strategic outcomes (Scottish Government, 2012a). The criticism here was that SOAs were introduced as part of a refined financial and performance framework, based on concepts of rational planning. However, whereas a Treasury model would stress the need for a direct link between budgets, outputs and outcomes, SOAs do not possess such a direct operational link (Midwinter, 2009). Rather they set down strategic ambitions, but do not earmark overall or organisational budgets to ensure these ambitions are delivered on. Further, SOAs were originally designed to focus on just six indicators for local government, so the growth in indicators it is argued now makes the process unmanageable (Midwinter, 2009). Current guidance for SOA still stress the six broad themes, with generic references to place-based solutions, but the what, how and where aspects noted by Midwinter are still not there.
Three years on from Malcolm Chisholm’s examination of the people and place dichotomy in regeneration Alex Neil, the incoming SNP Minister for Housing and Communities revisited this debate. In contrast to Chisholm he noted that despite long-standing efforts, there were still significant problems in relation to poverty and deprivation: “with some 840,000 individuals, or 17 per cent of Scotland’s population, currently living in poverty, a figure that included 210,000 children, or 21 per cent of all Scottish children” (JRF, 2009, quoted in Scottish Government, 2009: 1). After repeating the now ubiquitous statement about the importance of learning from previous approaches, he stressed the need to move forward on both fronts simultaneously (Scottish Government, 2009). The emergent strategy made a commitment to focusing on reforming the way in which mainstream resources are used to support vulnerable communities; ensure a stronger focus on community-led regeneration; and finally, realise the economic potential of all Scotland’s communities through focussed funding and other support mechanisms (Scottish Government, 2011). It also signalled the Community Empowerment and Renewal Bill, currently progressing through Parliament, which seeks to make it easier for communities to take on public assets. The only problem with both the policy focus and future Act is that there are very limited public resources to support such ambitions. Further, the ever expanding policy reach of regeneration, which now stretches to embrace town centres, place-making, enterprise zones, digital inclusion, sustainability and business improvement districts, to name but six recently added elements, can only produce a dilution of strategic focus. Without access to a significant earmarked regeneration budget, all these initiatives require to fall back on the bending of mainstream budgets. The current People and Communities budget is tokenistic when compared to in scale to previously available regeneration funds.

The other real problem with the emergent policy framework is that it does not appear to be working. Audit Scotland has undertaken a couple of major reviews of the workings of CPPs and both were highly critical of the relative absence of strategic capacity and tangible evidence of joint working arrangements (Audit Scotland, 2011; 2013). It also revealed significant variations in approach with distinct strengths and more commonly weaknesses across the authorities studies. Perhaps the most worrying aspect, and one that ties back to a sustained criticism of regeneration practice, is that there is little or nothing said about employment, the root of many localised social problems (McGregor and McConnachie, 1998; McGregor et al., 1998; Rae 2012). Neither the current Edinburgh, nor Glasgow SOA have a direct tie up with the local labour market. While the Glasgow SOA has tackling youth unemployment as one of its three objectives, there is not a clear link with a detailed local economic development strategy, or associated labour market demands. The negative social and economic problems associated with burgeoning youth unemployment are well made, but how the SOA can best address these is not clearly articulated. The 2014 Commonwealth Games can only ever provide a limited labour market spin off. Further, while the interconnections and implications of health matters are well made, as is the need to foster early interventions, especially in relation to the wider social and economic costs of alcohol abuse, again detailed in the Glasgow SOA, the actual connection with Health Board planning and SOA, and planning and actual programme delivery still appears distant and somewhat detached (ODS, 2013). The problems and consequences of these problems are well understood, but the CPPs agreed vision to address them appears thin and not well worked through, more of a wish list than a planned set of agreed and budgeted action.

This is hardly a new issue, as this review details. In the past SE passed down its statutory duty to participate in Community Planning to the LECs, and never defined what that contribution should be. Now, with the recent demise of the LECs, in both SE and HIE, and the re-emergence of a distinct and separate training body, Skills Scotland (SS), this statutory requirement remains a challenge to pin down given none of these entities now has a local geographic mode of operation. Not
surprisingly, SOA say little about local economic development, while SE, HIE and SS offer strategies and outcomes for their respective economic ambitions that do not easily tie across to the 32 geographically specific SOAs.

The deep public expenditure cuts, brought in by the UK Coalition Government’s austerity programme from 2010, which will also impact on the Barnett Formula consequentials, will bring about a dramatic decline in the Scottish Government’s budget. While concerns as to the impacts of these cuts has produced a lot more talking between CPPs, joint budgeting and working still appears to be a long way off (personal interview), as recently illustrated by the problems with health and social care joint working pilots in Lanarkshire (Scottish Government, 2012b). When public expenditure was more abundant, partners talked about the need and value of joint working, but largely still did their own thing. Now, as the combined resource base available to CPPs drops away, the need to work together becomes all the more obvious. Yet still, despite such encouragement, little is happening on the ground (Audit Commission, 2011; 2013). The recently published Christie Commission makes a passionately case for all parties involved in local service delivery to find the means to deliver on both partnership and joint working (Christie Commission, 2011). Yet, some fifteen years on from the advent of community planning per se, and thirty years on from ‘New Life’, the organisational, budgeting and delivery challenges presented by partnership working are still to be fully addressed.

Work still continues in this area, with perhaps most emphasis being in trying to better integrate adult health and social care, via the utilisation of the Change Fund (Scottish Government, 2013d). These are small, defined budgets under different priority areas, such as children, elderly and such like, which CPP’s bid for to enhance and improve preventative joint-working across public services. As highlighted throughout this chapter, this has been the general direction of travel for public policy, as conceptualised by the Scottish Government. However, ambition for now over a decade has been stymied by the pre-existing organisational structures and their associated working practices within the public services (Christie Commission, 2011). Further, given the prime focus here is thus organisational, it is thus largely non-spatial.
Looking back over 80 years regeneration in Scotland exudes a distinctive ‘Groundhog Day’ quality, given the many communities subjected to almost cyclical renewal practices ever since the original slum clearance programme brought them into existence back in the 1930s. It is also evident that Glasgow, in particular, has long dominated the various programmes and initiatives over these years, but despite this focus, still finds itself consistently at the bottom of socio-economic indicators for Scotland, the UK and Europe.

Deprived places, identified in the latest by SIMD, for 2012, are similar to those identified in previous Index editions (2009, 2006, 2004). Of the 976 datazones found in the 15 per cent most deprived in SIMD 2012, about three quarters (77 per cent) were also in the 15 per cent most deprived in all the previous editions. Of these appearing in SIMD 2012, only five per cent had never appeared in this category before (SIMD, 2013).

The most deprived 2012 datazone was Ferguslie Park, Paisley. It had been the most deprived in 2006, and was ranked 2nd in 2009. The other datazones in the top five order by most deprived datazones are:

- Possil Park, Glasgow City
- Keppochhill, Glasgow (adjacent to Possil Park)
- Ferguslie, Paisley, Renfrewshire, (another within Ferguslie Park)
- Parkhead West and Barrowfield (in Glasgow’s East End).

All were originally clearance estates, seeing new council housing built in the 1930s to solve the slum conditions and associated health problems, and each has since been subject to a variety of renewal initiatives since the 1970s. Ferguslie was Scotland’s only CDP project in 1968 and, subsequently, one of the four New Life partnerships in 1988. Both Parkhead and Barrowfield were part of the GEAR project, while Keppoch and Possil underwent extensive council and housing association investments, dating back to the Heath’s Conservative government of the 1970s. All five have undergone substantial subsequent clearance and partial rebuilding programmes during the 1990s and 2000s.

Glasgow, long the core focus of so much of Scotland’s renewal efforts, still finds itself with 42 per cent of its 694 datazones being in the 15 per cent most deprived datazones in 2012. This compares to 44 per cent in 2009, 48 per cent in 2006 and 52 per cent in 2004.

Datazones are the lowest Census geography in Scotland, with a population of between 500 and 1,000 people.
In total, 742,200 people live in Scotland’s 15 per cent most deprived areas. However, it is important to remember that the SIMD identifies deprived places not people, given not everyone living in a deprived area is deprived, and not all deprived people live in deprived places. Of the nearly three-quarters of a million people living in these deprived areas, just under a third (31 per cent), amounting to a quarter of a million people, were defined as income deprived (SIMD, 2013). Drawing from the 2011 Census, the employment rate in the 15 per cent most deprived areas in Scotland was 58 per cent, compared to a rate of 73 per cent for the rest of Scotland. The unemployment rate in the most deprived decile, the top ten per cent most deprived datazones, was more than three times that in the least deprived decile (17 per cent compared to five per cent). Strikingly one of the most glaring reasons for this economic inactivity was long-term sickness, not something regeneration policy has focused upon. In the first quintile, the 20 per cent most deprived datazones, sickness accounts for nearly half of the economic inactivity, compared to just ten per cent in the fifth, or least deprived quintile.

As a measure the SIMD is not sensitive to an ‘absolute’ improvement in relation to deprivation. For example, up to 2008 worklessness overall dropped by some 20 per cent, reflecting the improved national economic position. However, during the recession these gains have markedly fallen away. What is striking is that the ‘relative’ relative positioning of deprived neighbourhoods has not really altered over time. These are two distinct issues, in that there can be an ‘absolute’ internal experience of change, but it fails to alter the ‘relative’ positioning of places in respect of deprivation.

Taken together, the geographic locus of poverty and deprivation does not appear to have migrated that much in 80 years, despite all that regeneration activity. That said, 70 per cent of income-deprived households reside outwith these apparently fixed poor neighbourhoods. Much has been said about the dynamics of poverty, at a neighbourhood level, but the household turnover, or churn, within such localities is not dramatically different from slightly better off neighbourhoods (Bailey et al, 2012).

Traditionally, central government ‘top sliced’ local government budgets to provide both elements of its regeneration programme: physical improvements which long targeted slum conditions, as well as Urban Aid which focused more on people in deprived council estates. Both interventions were area-based interventions. Although the political context changed, it was a decade into the Thatcher administration before the actual operation of regeneration policy altered, with its focus moving more towards council estates and the programme delivery became overtly centrally controlled, via distinct agencies and budgets. While the policy rhetoric espoused the need to embrace enterprise and business, the delivery was still very much state funded and controlled. Then with devolution another change in political context occurred, which saw central government progressively withdraw over time, leaving it to local government and its partners to set down its broad strategic goals to deliver social justice, rather than regeneration. It would be wrong to suggest power was further devolved, rather it was a partnership whereby government insisted that local government joined them in ensuring that their nationally agreed policy outcomes were locally delivered.

By focusing on regeneration it is possible to trace out the slow but steady trajectory towards this outcomes-based agenda, which long embraced the managerialist ambitions of both central and local government administrators, who saw much merit in pursuing partnership working. Trying to take forward regeneration programmes, of different sorts and over differing timeframes and policy contexts, encouraged them to adopt a broader, more holistic understanding of what constituted regeneration, an ambition dating right back to the 1970s. One outcome of this change is a new power relationship between the two levels of government, and effectively the demise of
agency working. This also brought with it the accompanying loss of distinct and separate budgets that such agencies previously drew upon to meet their goals. Not surprisingly, given the history outlined in this paper, the core task of economic planning and development was not part of this reform agenda, and neither was health service planning. Under partnership working there has been a sustained effort at a national policy level to ensure better co-ordination of existing budgets, and encouragement to bend mainstream budgets to tackle perceived and agreed problem areas, but these are now people or issue focussed, rather than being spatial. This shift has, as a consequence, brought with it the almost complete demise of an area-based focus on regeneration, and this represents a major finding of this review, given it is in stark contrast with both Wales and Northern Ireland. Further, what little now constitutes as traditional regeneration activity is also now broader, embracing a wide variety of ‘community projects’, as the recent Regeneration Capital Fund ably illustrates.

The withdrawal of area-based regeneration funding from poor neighbourhoods could be taken as an acknowledgement that such places house only a minority of poor people, and are not the cause of their own poverty, but rather illustrative of how other broader socio-economic forces help foster such neighbourhood deterioration (van Ham and Manley, 2010; Hastings, 2004; Mathews, 2010; 2012). But does this not also imply that the poorer neighbourhoods are now expected to solve their own problems in situ, without the additional help of the past? While such area-based programmes had problems in relation to the targeting of resources to needs, they did express a commitment to address a spatially manifestation of extreme poverty, and thus a sustained political interest in the issue.

Perhaps more germane to this change of emphasis is a powerful managerial argument, namely that the actual scale of available regeneration cash, in whatever form, was always small, when compared to the scale of combined mainstream budgets. Currently, Scotland’s public service spending, which is subject to major cuts, amounts to £35bn for 2014/14 (Scottish Government, 2013). This means that local authority spending will fall from £7.2bn in this current financial year to £6.5bn in the next. It is worth noting, at its peak in the early 1990s, total earmarked regeneration monies amounted to £400m.

But there is a major problem here, and it is simply that the evidence amassed for this review can find no tangible evidence that bending mainstream budgets to address poverty and deprivation is actually taking place. In fact, the evidence indicates that SOAs, and before them CPs, are a weak and ineffective strategic planning tool given the lack of a direct tie back to budgeting and funding (Audit Scotland, 2011; 2013; Christie Commission, 2012; Midwinter, 2009). There are two issues here, firstly, the lack of dedicated budgets to address SOA ambitions and, secondly, the limited scope CPPs have in influencing the decisions about mainstream agencies budgets. While there are Change Funds to help facilitate agreed joint working, focussed on Scottish Government specified target groups, again people rather than place focused, given the scale of recent expenditure cuts these are likely to shore up existing services than illustrate a ‘decisive shift to prevention’. In such a tight fiscal environment organisations will act to protect their own budgets, rather than pool them. That said, the almost glacial lack of progress in respect of community or participatory budgeting also suggests there is no real public service buy into adopting this mode of working, despite encouragement from the Christie Commission.

Further, there is still no clear tie up with the physical or economic planning system, nor a robust system of monitoring and evaluation operated by either local or central government, nor its partners (personal interviews). The connections with health service spending are also quite opaque, despite ill health being so core to poverty. Then add to this contemporary research on service delivery within poor
neighbourhoods, in the case of cleaning and environmental services (Hastings, 2005), and historic evidence from the SRCs pioneering ‘Social Strategy for the Eighties’ (SRC, 1983; Young, 1999) initiative, and it is evident that bending mainstream budgets, to target additional resources to either poorer neighbourhoods, or particular disadvantaged groups, always constitutes a step too far for local government bureaucracy. The addition of other planning partners, into this mix, has not altered that reality, given the strong parallels in professional training, imbedded understandings of public service delivery, distinct organisational structures and commitment to preserving dedicated budgets. This is, of course, hardly a new problem. After all, was it not in response to such perceived failings, on the part of local government, that central government was encouraged to engage in regeneration in the late 1960s, through establishing distinct budgets, dedicated agencies and area-based strategies? It may be that we are witnessing a broader public policy cycle where specific place based interventions are set aside in favour of better universal delivery models.

In this context the review has also revealed a strongly held commitment to positivism, delivered through rational evidence driven policy-making, informing broad master planning – initially CPs and now SOA. Hence, the long held commitment, no matter the political administration, to refining organisational structures and the incessant refinement of management processes, over the last 25 years of partnership working. With its antecedence in refining management practices associated with fostering regeneration partnership working, a new basis of local authority strategic planning has emerged over the last decade. Yet, as the evidence reveals, despite such commitment and a concerted policy effort to this mode of working, major problems persist with partnership working, especially in terms of shared strategic thinking and critically with progressing joint budgeting (Christie Commission, 2011; Audit Scotland, 2013).

This antecedence helps explain another related finding, namely that success tends to be couched primarily in terms of organisational and managerial innovation, and the detailing of what constituted ‘good practice’ rather than in the actual impact such initiatives have had in addressing poverty and deprivation. This was perhaps most evident within the SIPs reviews. Being able to say whether the project under review was actually addressing the core ambitions of improving the lives of poor people has rarely, if ever been answered. Scottish experience here is at variance with practice in England, but mirrors that of Wales and Northern Ireland. Each commissioned evaluation, for the last 30 years, has consistently recommended improved baseline and operational data collection, as being the only means to enhance the robustness of such evaluations. Given the ubiquity of this recommendation what is hard to explain is why this has yet to be properly acted upon. In the case of SIPs, the assembly of standardised small grain area and operational data, to allow for the ongoing evaluative of the impact of these interventions, had been made a funding requirement. Just why were these continuous pleas and, in later cases, direct instructions to ensure a proper evaluative framework was put in place, consistently ignored? Was it that assembling such data proved just to challenging? Were the funders unwilling, or unable to enforce these funding requirements? What this means is that after four decades, it is actually impossible to say what the impact of this work actually had, if any (Fyfe, 2009; McGregor, 2009). Generally, in the past it was easy to list the top line budget headings, and the number of houses built or improved, although in recent years even this task has become harder. It has also never been possible to detail the actual outcomes of such investment, despite the entire drift of public policy being to insist upon this happening.

In other countries, most notably in the Netherlands and Denmark, the approach adopted to facilitate joint working and enhance an outcomes focused approach has differed, in that they attach a single neighbourhood budget, and then ask the differing
community and engaged professional interests to work together to set local priorities and then actively monitor these. Such a real devolution of power and money has never been attempted in Scotland, in large part, because the various parties involved in regeneration practice have long been unwilling to succeed power, and especially to local people. This is hardly anything new, as a re-reading the Skeffington Report (1968) poignantly illustrates. The problem revealed by this review is that without a distinct place dimension, mainstream budgeting proves discriminatory while, at the same time, area-based initiatives have consistently not been able to show marked changes in the social, as opposed to physical conditions within these localities.

Finally, it is ironic, that the rhetoric of regeneration has long proffered an extensive lexicon extolling the importance of involving local people: community consultation, involvement, engagement, participation and empowerment. Glasgow’s community-based housing associations offered one long-established and successful mode of such working, but although regularly name checked when promoting other initiatives, most notably the Glasgow housing stock transfer, this approach was not acted upon, nor utilised by those exercising the power within the field of regeneration. Rather the language of community found itself hijacked, so much so that the entire strategic planning system is now the responsibility of Community Plan Partners, bodies that have been continually criticised for failing to engage with, let alone embrace local communities in their work (ODS, 2006; Fyfe, 2009; Audit Scotland, 2013). Those with power capture the discourse, and Scottish regeneration bears witness to that reality.
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